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ABSTRACT 
The signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) technique can be used to rapidly detect nitrogen-
rich explosives at standoff distances. This technique uses a template-matching procedure that 
produces a figure-of-merit (FOM) whose value is used to distinguish between inert and explosive 
materials. The present study develops a tiered-filter implementation of the signature-based 
radiation scanning technique, which reduces the number of templates needed. This approach 
starts by calculating a normalized FOM between signatures from an unknown target and an 
explosive template through stages or tiers (nitrogen first, then oxygen, then carbon, and finally 
hydrogen).  If the normalized FOM is greater than a specified cut-off value for any of the tiers, 
the target signatures are considered not to match that specific template and the process is 
repeated for the next explosive template until all of the relevant templates have been considered. 
If a target’s signatures match all the tiers of a single template, then the target is assumed to 
contain an explosive.  The tiered filter approach uses eight elements to construct artificial 
explosive-templates that have the function of representing explosives cluttered with real 
materials.  The feasibility of the artificial template approach to systematically build a library of 
templates that successfully differentiates explosive targets from inert ones in the presence of 
clutter and under different geometric configurations was explored.  In total, 10 different 
geometric configurations were simulated and analyzed using the MCNP5 code. For each 
configuration, 51 different inert materials were used as inert samples and as clutter in front of the 
explosive cyclonite (RDX).  The geometric configurations consisted of different explosive 
volumes, clutter thicknesses, and distances of the clutter from the neutron source.  Additionally, 
an objective function was developed to optimize the parameters that maximize the sensitivity and 
specificity of the method. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
Attacks from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are one of the major threats to military and 
law enforcement personnel, as well as to civilians.  To counter this threat, several technologies 
have been developed to detect IEDs.  The existing technologies for explosive detection can be 
classified into three groups: non-explosive component detection, trace detection, and bulk 
detection. 
Non-explosive component detection methods consist of detecting IED parts that are not 
explosive by nature, such as detonators, shell casings, and unique circuitry.  These methods are 
not widely used because of their high rate of false alarms. 
Trace-detection methods rely on detecting explosive vapors or particulates that can be 
sampled and identified.  The main disadvantages of these techniques are that they require 
collection of vapor samples from the vicinity of the target or examination of the target at a short 
range. 
Bulk detection methods attempt to identify macroscopic properties of the explosive 
device mainly through imaging or scanning methods.  Imaging bulk-detection methods, such as 
computed tomography (CT) and radiography, have the drawbacks of relying on user 
interpretation (or complex software algorithms) and of not being well suited for standoff 
detection.  Scanning bulk-detection methods, such as neutron interrogation techniques, have 
achieved some success.  A good survey article is provided by Buffler [1]. 
The IED detection problem is very complicated, and improved methods are required.  In 
particular, a system that can detect IEDs rapidly, from a safe distance, and that does not depend 
on user interpretation, is sought. 
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The signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) method developed by Dunn et al. [2] has 
the potential to detect IEDs in a rapid (completed within seconds), remote (standoff distances of 
over a meter), and automated (no analysis of an image required) manner.  This method uses 
characteristic back-streaming radiation responses (signatures) from unknown targets jointly with 
a template-matching procedure to recognize hidden explosives.  Photon-scattered and photon-
induced positron annihilation signatures [3] as well as inelastic-scatter and prompt-capture 
gamma ray signatures [4] have been used successfully in preliminary research to detect explosive 
surrogates.  Radiation signatures such as these can be obtained from interrogating an unknown 
target and then can be compared to a library of known explosive templates. Each explosive 
template consists of radiation signatures expected for a given explosive in a particular 
configuration.  A particular configuration is specified by several factors, such as the type, 
placement, and quantity of explosive, and the type, placement, and quantity of inert material 
(clutter) in relation to the explosive. 
One of the main challenges of the SBRS technology is the need to develop a systematic 
method that reduces all the possible configurations of the explosive templates to a finite and 
manageable number.  The response of an explosive sample is affected by several factors such as 
chemical composition, distance from the neutron source, quantity, nearby clutter material, and so 
forth. In order for the template matching procedure to work, these factors must be incorporated 
into the explosive templates in a systematic and efficient way. The more an explosive template 
resembles an explosive sample the easier it is to identify the explosive accurately. Therefore, the 
explosive template library should efficiently consist of as many explosive templates in different 
configurations as needed to be effective, with the constraint that the number of these templates 
should be manageable by a computer.  The overall goal of this research is to develop a method 
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that will reduce the number of explosive templates necessary to distinguish between unknown 
explosive and inert samples under several different conditions, including the presence of clutter.  
Achieving this goal involves investigation of a tiered-filter approach and construction of an 
objective function whose maximum identifies the optimum model parameters. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
This study addresses the problem of differentiating an unknown target that contains a nitrogen-
rich explosive sample (an IED), from a target that contains only non-explosive materials.  The 
technique must be able to provide a systematic method of constructing a library of templates that 
identifies most explosive samples of all the possible different target configurations subject to the 
constraints that exist in the field (e.g., the space constraint that an explosive configuration is 
subject to an interrogated volume within the trunk of a car) and that discards inert samples.  In 
particular, the technique must be able to use a finite and manageable number of templates to 
identify explosive samples that have clutter thicknesses, distance from the source, and explosive 
volumes that are slightly different from those characteristic of the library templates.  
Additionally, the technique must also provide a robust method to represent the infinite types of 
possible clutter material by a finite number of templates.  The approach is to develop a tiered-
filter technique, based on the SBRS technology. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main goal of this study is to develop a technique based on the signature-based radiation 
scanning method that identifies targets that contain nitrogen-rich explosives at standoff distances 
of greater than 0.5 m with high levels of sensitivity and specificity.  The specific objectives are: 
 Develop a method that is able to identify an explosive sample even in the presence of 
clutter in different geometric configurations.  The following configuration parameters are 
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considered in this study: 
o Clutter chemical composition 
o Clutter thickness 
o Distance of clutter from neutron source 
o Explosive volume 
 Focus on incorporating features into the method that exploit particular characteristics of 
nitrogen-rich explosives to differentiate them from inert materials. 
 Identify the limitations of the method for each particular type of configuration. 
 Develop a systematic methodology of constructing a library of templates that identifies 
explosive samples of all the possible different target configurations.  In essence, the 
method should be able to identify a large number of explosive configurations with a 
relatively small number of templates. 
 Define a normalized form of the figure-of-merit function. 
 Construct an algorithm that optimizes the parameters used in the method to give the best 
performance based on sensitivity and specificity. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Improvised explosive devices have been used in conflicts throughout the world since World War 
II.  However, the threat of these devices has increased since the second conflict in Iraq.  Due to 
the high number of deaths and injuries from IEDs, the United States Army put together a special 
task force in the fall 2004 to find solutions to reduce the threat from IEDs [5].  The effort and 
large investment made by the United States Army to solve this problem, indicates the seriousness 
of the IED threat. 
The feasibility to use the signature-based radiation scanning method to detect IEDs has 
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been established.  The SBRS technology has the ability to be simple, rapid, automated, and 
remote.  The library of templates in the SBRS method plays a crucial role in identifying 
explosives of different target configurations.   The method presented in this study, provides a 
systematic approach to build this library of templates.  If successful, IEDs in different target 
configurations, which include the presence of clutter, can be identified with high levels of 
sensitivity and specificity. 
1.5 Definition of Terms 
This section provides definitions for terms with which the reader might not be familiar.  In 
addition, common terms that have a special meaning in the study are presented. 
Explosive – In this study, explosives refers exclusively to nitrogen-rich explosives [6]. 
Inert – In this study, inert refers to any material that is not a nitrogen rich explosive.  Thus, even 
though some materials can be dangerous (e.g., anthrax, nitrogen rich fertilizers), they are not 
considered explosives. 
Clutter – Any inert material that alters the response of the detection system. 
True Positive – A reading from the system indicating that an explosive is present, when an 
explosive is in fact present. 
True Negative – A reading from the system indicating that no explosive is present, when no 
explosive is in fact present. 
True Suspect – A reading from the system indicating that the presence of an explosive is 
suspected, when an explosive is in fact present. 
False Positive - A reading from the system indicating that an explosive is present, when no 
explosive is in fact present. 
False Negative - A reading from the system indicating that no explosive is present, when an 
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explosive is in fact present. 
False Suspect – A reading from the system indicating that the presence of an explosive is 
suspected, when an explosive is in fact not present. 
Remote – Ideally, a safe distance so that the detection system is not severely harmed if the 
explosive device detonates.  However, because this research is in its preliminary stages, it refers 
to distances 0.5 m or larger. 
Sensitivity – Performance indicator that reflects the ability of a system to identify an explosive if 
an explosive is present.  In this study, the mathematical definition of sensitivity is modified to 
include samples labeled as suspects. 
Specificity – Performance indicator that reflects the ability of a system to identify an inert if an 
inert is present.  In this study, the mathematical definition of specificity is modified to include 
samples labeled as suspects. 
Target – A volume interrogated by the detection system that may or may not contain an 
explosive sample hidden inside it. 
Signature – A characteristic response from a target that can be used to differentiate explosive 
targets from inert ones. 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
Existing and potential standoff explosive detection techniques are reviewed in Chapter 2.  A 
historical overview of the problem and a description of the elements of detection are given in the 
first sections.  The chemical composition and density of nitrogen rich explosives is also 
considered.  These characteristics of nitrogen rich explosives are very important because the 
method presented in this study relies heavily on them.  Trace and bulk detection methods are the 
two main types of detection techniques that are reviewed.  The signature-based radiation 
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scanning technique is reviewed in Section 2.6.  This technique provides the basis for the method 
developed in this research. 
The tiered-filter approach to the signature-based radiation scanning technique is 
introduced in Chapter 3.  The theoretical background is given in section 3.3.  Then the method is 
described and its potential to achieve the objectives described in section 1.3 is discussed.  
Section 3.5, presents the procedure through which the parameters used by the tiered-filter 
approach are optimized.  The objective function that maximizes the sensitivity and specificity is 
discussed in this section. 
The experimental procedure is discussed in Chapter 4.  Simulation results based on 
MCNP5 were performed.  The geometry used for the simulations is presented in Section 4.3.  
Section 4.4 describes how the explosive and inert samples were generated.  Section 4.5 describes 
how the library of artificial templates is built.  This section is of great importance because it 
addresses one of the main objectives of this research. 
The experimental results produced by the tiered-filter approach are given in Chapter 5.  
Different cases testing the performance of the method are presented.  This is done by calculating 
the sensitivity and specificity produced by libraries of artificial templates and the sets of 
unknown samples that have clutter composition, clutter thickness, distance from the source, or 
explosive volumes different from the templates in the libraries.  Results using the tiered-filter 
approach are compared against the original signature-based radiation scanning figure-of-merit. 
A summary of the study is presented in Chapter 6.  Conclusions and discussion of the 
experimental results obtained in Chapter 5 are presented here.  Recommendation for future 
research is given in the final section. 
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CHAPTER 2 – REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the literature and research related to this study.  First, a brief overview of 
the history of the IED problem is given.  The major conflicts where this device has been used in 
large scales are presented here.  Then, the concepts that describe the IED problem, the 
methodologies to assess the performance of explosive detection systems, and the parameters that 
describe the explosive devices and their environment, are discussed.  The typical chemical 
composition and density of nitrogen-rich explosives are presented in section 2.4, among other 
important characteristics.  Next, the literature of different explosive detection techniques is 
reviewed.  The review is divided into trace detection and bulk detection methods.  Finally, a 
literature review of the signature-based radiation scanning technique is given. 
2.2 Brief Historical Overview of the Problem 
The British Army was the first to come up with the term Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
in the 1970s to describe the highly effective booby trap devices or remote-controlled bombs, 
made from agricultural fertilizer and semtex, which were used by the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA).  However, large scale use of IEDs occurred earlier, during World War 
II.  In particular, the Belarussian guerrillas used command-detonated and delayed-fuse IEDs to 
derail German trains between 1943 and 1944 [7].  Improvised explosive devices have been 
extensively used since then in many conflicts, primarily in terrorist actions or unconventional 
warfare by guerrilla forces.  
During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong used IEDs against American land- and river-
borne vehicles and personnel.  The devices were usually built from unexploded ordnance from 
the American military forces.  Thirty-three percent of American casualties during this conflict 
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were attributed to mines and IEDs [8]. 
 The Provisional Irish Republican Army used IEDs extensively in Northern Ireland during 
1969-1997.  The IEDs developed by the IRA became highly sophisticated, featuring anti-
handling devices such as mercury tilt switch or micro-switches that would detonate the explosive 
if moved in any way.  The ongoing battle to gain the upper hand in electronic warfare with 
remote controlled devices led the bomb disposal teams from the 321 EOD (Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal) to employ specialists from QinetiQ, the Royal Signals, and Military Intelligence.  Most 
of the modern techniques, weapons, and equipment currently used by EOD operators throughout 
the world resulted from this multi-unit approach [9]. 
The United States supplied the Afghan Mujahideen large quantities of military supplies 
six months before the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  The Afghan insurgents removed 
explosives from anti-tank mines and combined them in tin cooking oil cans for a more powerful 
blast.  After these IEDs were detonated the Afghan insurgents often followed the attack with 
direct-fire weapons.  Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the most common and 
dangerous method of attack against NATO forces, Afghan military, and civilian vehicles has 
been the use of IEDs.  The attacks using these destructive devices has increased consistently 
[10]. 
In the Iraq 2003-2011 War, the damage that IEDs attacks had on American military 
forces was major.  According to the Washington Post, 64% of U.S. deaths in Iraq were caused by 
IEDs [11].  Most of these devices were made with artillery or mortar shells, or with varying 
amounts of bulk or homemade explosives.  The United Kingdom government charged that Iran 
was supplying insurgents with the technological know-how to build these IEDs [12].  This 
charge was denied by both the Iranian and Iraqi government officials [13]. 
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 Other conflicts that have seen extensive use of these destructive devices during 
unconventional guerrilla warfare or terrorist attacks are: 
 Hezbollah used IEDs extensively against Israeli Forces after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982 [14]. 
 The IEDs used by Chechnyan rebels during the First Chechnyan War (1994-1996) and 
the Second Chechnyan War (1999-2008) accounted for many Russian deaths [15]. 
 On July 13 of 2011, the Indian Mujahideen terrorist group detonated three IEDs on the 
city of Mumbai which killed 19 people and injured 130 more [16]. 
 Buses, trucks, and tanks were the target of IEDs used by military insurgents in the recent 
Syrian uprisings [17]. 
Because of the vast experience that military forces from Canada, India, Israel, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and the United States have had with IEDs used against them in either conflict 
or terrorists attacks, they are at the forefront of counter-IED efforts.  However, because IEDs are 
improvised devices, there are no specific guidelines for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
personnel to identify or categorize them.  Currently, no comprehensive solution to the IED 
problem exists [18]. 
2.3 Elements of Detection:  Concepts, Threats, and Devices 
The process of detecting an explosive at a standoff distance involves receiving a signal, 
processing the signal, analyzing the results, and evaluating whether the target contains an 
explosive or not.  The performance of detection methodologies are usually assessed by concepts 
such as the sensitivity and specificity of the system, or by the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curves.  The definitions of sensitivity and specificity are given in section 1.5.  The ROC 
curves are plots of the probability that a methodology will yield a true positive versus the 
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probability that the same methodology will yield a false positive.  Consequently, ROC curves 
combine the sensitivity and specificity performance of a system, and provide a practical method 
of comparing different detection techniques.  In this thesis, the objective function used to 
optimize the parameters of the tiered-filter approach (which also combines the sensitivity and 
specificity performance of the system) is used to evaluate the performance of the method instead 
of the ROC curves. 
 The overall performance of a detection system built on multiple technologies, in the 
presence of environmental, threat, and other potential detection confusers the system might face, 
is given by the system effectiveness (SE).  The system effectiveness measures the scale to which 
a detection system achieves a set of specific mission requirements.  It depends on the threat 
characterization, environment, and technology, among other factors.  Furthermore, the concept of 
SE incorporates additional important concerns such as the mass of the explosive, available 
sampling time, and human intervention. 
An essential component for solving the standoff bomb detection problem involves having 
a general understanding of the scenarios of concern, and the parameters that describe the 
explosive device and the surrounding environment.  Two of the scenarios that are currently been 
given primary consideration because of the difficulty to detect them on time are suicide bombers 
and wide-area surveillance of explosives.  The parameters that define these types of scenarios are 
known as threat parameters.  These threat parameters can be categorized into three groups: those 
related to the local environment, those describing the explosive device, and those that 
characterize the bomber.  From the parameters related to the local environment, the most 
important is the intended target of the explosive detonation.  The reason for this is that an 
understanding of what the potential target might be, helps prioritize the areas that should be 
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monitored and protected. 
 Finally, a significant concept used to describe the relation between two or more 
explosive detection systems is the concept of orthogonality.  If two detection methods are 
designed to detect independent characteristics of an IED then the methods are said to be 
orthogonal.  When two or more of these orthogonal methods are used together they are referred 
to as a system of orthogonal detection technologies.  The benefits of using such a system are that 
the sensitivity of the combined system is higher than that of the individual components, the 
effectiveness is also greater, and the difficulty of defeating the detection system increases. 
2.4 Chemical Composition and Density of Explosives 
Because of the diversity of potential explosive formulations, the detection of explosives based on 
their chemical characteristics represents a significant challenge.  The problem of standoff bomb 
detection, however, narrows the focus to high explosives.  Fortunately, if elemental formulations 
are considered, few common chemicals can be confused with nitrogen-rich high explosives.  
According to the online Aldrich catalog of common laboratory and industrial chemicals and 
polymers, which contains over 90,000 chemicals, only one explosive elemental composition 
from the 26 nitrogen-rich high explosives listed in Table 2.1 had an isomer.  The explosive is 
TNT, which has the same elemental composition as dinitroanthranilic acid.  Table 2.1 presents a 
list of nitrogen-rich high explosives that can easily be used as IEDs. 
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Table 2.1 Representative Common Nitrogen-Rich High Explosives and Their Compositions 
Explosives Based on Nitrogen Formula wt % H wt % C wt % N wt % O Sum N+O 
Ammonium Nitrate H4N2O3 5.04 0 35.01 59.97 94.98 
Ammonium Picrate C6H6N4O7 2.46 29.28 22.76 45.5 68.26 
Cyclonite (RDX) C3H6N6O6 2.72 16.22 37.84 43.22 81.06 
Ethylenediamine Dinitrate C2H10N4O6 5.42 12.91 30.1 51.58 81.68 
Guanidine Nitrate CH6N4O3 4.95 9.84 45.89 39.32 85.21 
Hexamethylenetriperoxide Diamine C6H12N2O6 5.81 34.62 13.46 46.11 59.57 
Hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane C6H6N12O12 1.38 16.13 38.36 43.82 82.18 
Hydrazine Nitrate H5N3O3 5.3 0 44.2 50.09 94.29 
Mannitol Hexanitrate C6H8N6O18 1.78 15.94 18.59 63.69 82.28 
Monomethylene Nitrate CH4N2O3 4.38 13.05 30.43 52.14 82.57 
Nitrocellulose C6H7N3O11 2.37 24.24 14.14 59.23 73.37 
Nitroglycerin C3H5N3O9 2.22 15.87 18.5 63.41 81.91 
Nitrotriazolone C2H2N4O3 1.55 18.47 43.08 36.9 79.98 
Octogen (HMX) C4H8N8O8 2.72 16.22 37.84 43.22 81.06 
Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate C5H8N4O12 2.55 19 17.72 60.73 78.45 
Picric Acid C6H3N3O7 1.32 31.46 18.34 48.88 67.22 
Tetrazene C2H8N10O 4.29 12.77 74.44 8.5 82.94 
Tetryl C7H5N5O8 1.76 29.28 24.39 44.58 68.97 
Trinitrobenzene C6H3N3O6 1.42 33.82 19.72 45.05 64.77 
Trinitrotoluene C7H5N3O6 2.22 37.02 18.5 42.26 60.76 
Triminoguanidine Nitrate CH9N7O3 5.43 7.19 58.67 28.72 87.39 
Triaminotrinitrobenzene C6H6N6O6 2.34 27.92 32.55 37.19 69.74 
Trinitroazetidine C3H4N4O6 2.1 18.76 29.17 49.98 79.15 
Trinitrochlorobenzene C6H2N3O6 0.81 29.11 16.97 38.78 55.75 
Trinitropyridine C5H2N4O6 0.94 28.05 26.17 44.84 71.01 
Urea Nitrate CH5N3O4 4.09 9.76 34.14 52 86.14 
       
Average (%)  2.98 20.29 30.81 46.14 76.95 
Standard Deviation  ±1.38 ±8.15 ±11.01 ±8.01 ±8.47 
Maximum/Minimum (%)  5/0.8 37/0 58/13 63/9 95/56 
 
 High explosives are composed of oxidizing and reducing agents, which can be in a single 
molecule such as TNT, nitroglycerin, or PETN, or within an ionic solid, such as ammonium 
nitrate when mixed with fuel oil.  Strong oxidizing agents require the most electronegative 
elements such as nitrogen, oxygen, fluorine, and chlorine.  Because of their difficult chemistry, 
instability, and greater expense, fluorine and chlorine are used significantly less often in high 
explosives.  Therefore, typical high explosive chemicals contain large concentrations of nitrogen 
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and oxygen.  Carbon and hydrogen serve as reductant components of high explosives.  
Sometimes metal powders such as aluminum or magnesium are also added as supplemental 
reducing agents.  The density of these explosives typically ranges between 1.2 and 1.8 g/cm3 
[19]. 
The list of nitrogen explosives in Table 2.1 shows that the average nitrogen content is 
30.81 ±11.01% and that the average oxygen content is 46.18±8.01%.  These characteristics 
suggest that focus on percentage composition of nitrogen and oxygen might be a useful identifier 
of high explosives.  It has been stated that “A measurement of the oxygen and nitrogen densities, 
to an uncertainty of ±20%, gives a unique separation of explosives from other compounds” [20].  
Therefore, dual analysis of the nitrogen and oxygen concentration in a target provides more 
reliable identification of nitrogen-rich high explosives. 
2.5 Standoff Explosive Detection Techniques 
2.5.1 Trace Detection Methods 
Trace detection methods attempt to detect explosive vapors or explosive particulates.  Explosive 
vapors are gas molecules emitted from an explosive when the atmospheric pressure is greater 
than the vapor pressure of the explosive.  Explosive particulates are microscopic particles that 
adhere to any surface that has been in direct or indirect contact with an explosive.  Even though 
trace detection at standoff distances is a challenging task, several trace detection techniques have 
been developed and perform satisfactorily in certain scenarios.  The three main types of trace 
detection methods are electronic/chemical, optical, and biosensor. 
Two of the main electronic/chemical trace detection methods are chemiluminescence and 
mass spectrometry.  Chemiluminescence uses chemical reactions that produce electromagnetic 
radiation in the form of ultraviolet, visible, and infrared light [21].  In particular, this method is 
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used to detect nitrogen-rich explosives by detecting infrared light produced from the reaction 
between nitric oxide and ozone [22].  Mass spectrometry detects residual traces of explosives in 
contamination of air, dust, and so forth.  The method analyzes a substance in relation to the mass 
of its corresponding atoms, and it can be based on time separation or geometric separation [23]. 
Optical methods include infrared spectroscopy and microcantilevers.  Infrared 
spectroscopy is used to identify the chemical composition of explosives by examining the 
absorption spectrum from explosive particulates and vapors [24].  Microcantilevers detection 
consists of detecting explosive particulates using a cantilever.  Molecules absorbed on the 
unsupported side of the cantilever causes bending which can be monitored with high sensitivity 
[25].  Some of the benefits of this method for detection include the miniature size of the 
cantilevers, array detection capabilities, high sensitivity, and low power consumption [26]. 
Biosensors use the sense of smell or olfaction to detect explosives.  Canines, pigs, rats, 
bees, and microorganisms can be used as biosensors [27].  In particular, canines are frequently 
used, because of their exceptional olfactory ability and because they can be easily trained [28].  
The disadvantages of these methods include expensive training, brief operation time, and limited 
life-time of the animal. 
2.5.2 Bulk Detection Methods 
Bulk detection methods attempt to recognize macroscopic properties of the explosive.  These 
methods implement photon, microwave, or neutron techniques to identify the shape, density, or 
composition of the explosive.  The advantages of bulk detection methods compared to several 
trace detection methods are greater sensitivity, specificity, penetrability, as well as being able to 
operate at standoff distances and being able to interrogate the target faster.  
X-ray transmission technology provides information about the target density.  It is very 
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advanced and is used in many airport screening scenarios [29].  Unfortunately, this method is ill-
suited for standoff detection.  Backscattered X rays can be used at standoff distances [29].  
However, the low levels of specificity and the inability to effectively overcome explosive 
shielding present significant difficulties for this technology.   Computed tomography allows two-
dimensional images to be constructed, which provides excellent spatial resolution.  Different 
types of computed tomography are direct X-ray transmission imaging, coded X-ray scatter 
imaging, and coherent scatter X-ray computed tomography [30].  These methods are ill-suited 
for standoff detection because of the extensive scanning around the target. 
Electromagnetic imaging methods include microwave scanning and nuclear quadrupole 
resonance.  Microwave scanning can operate at standoff distances of 1 m or greater and requires 
simple inexpensive equipment [31].  Millimeter wave methods are similar to microwaves for 
detection purposes [32].  Both of these methods are best suited to interrogate people because they 
can penetrate clothing but have difficulties penetrating thicker clutter materials.  Nuclear 
quadrupole resonance is based on magnetic resonance physics.  It consists of applying a specific 
electric field gradient, which flips the nuclei electric quadrupole moment, generating a nuclear 
quadrupole resonance pulse [33].  This method has been used to detect explosives such as RDX, 
PETN, and HMX [34].  However, because it has to be within close range of the target, it is not 
well suited for standoff detection. 
 Two advantages of neutron interrogation techniques over the methods mentioned earlier 
are the ability to identify the stoichiometric composition of explosives and the capability to 
penetrate tens of cm into low and high Z materials.  Neutron methods can use thermal neutrons 
(thermal neutron analysis), fast neutrons (fast neutron analysis and pulsed fast neutron analysis), 
or both (pulsed fast and thermal neutron analysis).  The benefit of thermal neutron analysis is 
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that the absorption cross section for thermal neutrons is much higher than that for fast neutrons 
[1][35][36].  However, portable intense sources of thermal neutrons are difficult to manufacture.  
In fast neutron analysis, inelastic-scatter gamma rays are detected by high energy resolution 
detectors, such as high purity germanium detectors [35][36].  Pulsed fast neutron analysis is 
similar to fast neutron analysis, but neutrons are emitted in multiple nanosecond pulses [36].  
Pulsed fast and thermal neutron analysis consists of interrogating a target by alternating pulsed 
fast and thermal neutron beams [37]. 
2.6 Signature-Based Radiation Scanning Technique 
The Signature-Based Radiation Scanning (SBRS) technique is a radiation interrogation method 
developed by Dunn et al [2] that can be used to detect IEDs in a fast, standoff, and automated 
manner.  This method uses characteristic back-streaming radiation responses, called signatures, 
from unknown samples in combination with a template-matching procedure to evaluate if the 
target contains an explosive.  It has been shown that the technique is capable of detecting 
explosive surrogates by using photon-scattered and photon-induced positron annihilation 
signatures [3] as well as inelastic-scatter and prompt-capture gamma ray signatures [4].  After 
interrogating an unknown target the signatures are collected by detectors and then be compared 
to signatures in a library of known explosive templates.  The templates in the library contain 
signatures obtained for a given explosive in a particular configuration.  Different factors, such as 
the type, placement, and quantity of explosive, and the type, placement, and quantity of inert 
material (clutter) in relation to the explosive, specify these configurations. 
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CHAPTER 3 – TIERED-FILTER APPROACH TO THE 
SIGNATURE-BASED RADIATION SCANNING TECHNIQUE 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the proposed method to solve the IED problem as stated in Section 1.2.  
The method is called the tiered-filter approach (TFA) to the SBRS technique, which is based on 
the SBRS technique developed by Dunn et al [2].  Optimization of the parameters used in the 
TFA is also described in this chapter. 
 First a brief literature review and the theoretical background of the method are presented.  
The theoretical background includes a review of nuclear physics and of the SBRS technique.  
Then the TFA method, with all its different components and its benefits, is described.  The 
components that have been developed in this research are: 
 Hydrogen, Carbon, Nitrogen, and Oxygen (HCNO) tiers. 
 Density tier. 
 Artificial templates. 
 Normalization of figure-of-merit function. 
These components and their benefits are described in Section 3.4. 
Finally, the optimization of the parameters used in the TFA approach is described.  This is 
achieved by maximizing an objective function that portrays the performance of the system after 
having labeled (correctly or incorrectly) unknown targets in a group as explosives or non-
explosives.  The optimization of the objective function utilizes a simulated annealing algorithm.  
Construction and optimization of the objective function is a contribution of this research.  The 
simulated annealing algorithm was taken from Numerical Recipes in FORTRAN 77. 
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3.2 Review of Selected Literature and Research 
The detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at standoff distances is a very complicated 
and daunting challenge.  A number of technologies have been developed to address this problem.  
These can be classified into three main groups: non-explosive component detection, trace 
detection, and bulk detection.  In particular, scanning bulk-detection methods, such as neutron 
interrogation techniques, have achieved some success.  A survey article is provided by Buffler 
[1].  In spite of this, systems with better performance are still required. 
A radiation interrogation method that has the potential to detect IEDs in a rapid, remote, 
and automated manner, is the signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) technique developed by 
Dunn et al [2].  Characteristic back-streaming radiation responses, called signatures, from 
unknown samples are used jointly with a template-matching procedure to identify hidden 
explosives.  Preliminary research has shown that the method is able to detect explosive 
surrogates by using photon-scattered and photon-induced positron annihilation signatures [3] as 
well as inelastic-scatter and prompt-capture gamma ray signatures [4].  Signatures such as these 
can be collected by detectors after interrogating an unknown target and then can be compared to 
a library of known explosive templates.  Each explosive template in the library contains the 
responses obtained for a given explosive or an explosive-like substance in a particular 
configuration.  These configurations are specified by different factors, such as the type, 
placement, and quantity of explosive, and the type, placement, and quantity of inert material 
(clutter) in relation to the explosive. 
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3.3 Theoretical Background 
3.3.1 Elements of Nuclear Physics 
Atoms are composed of a nucleus surrounded by a cloud of electrons.  The nucleus is composed 
of protons and neutrons.  The number of protons in the nucleus determines the element.  
Therefore, interaction with the nucleus can give information about what element is present 
(stoichiometry).  Beams of neutrons and gamma rays combined with gamma detectors and 
neutron detectors can be used to obtain valuable information about the stoichiometry and density 
of explosives. 
Neutrons have neutral charge and interact primarily with nuclei, not with electrons.  
Nuclear forces that occur between neutrons and nuclei act at close range; therefore neutrons must 
pass near nuclei to interact with them.  Because the size of the nucleus is much smaller than the 
size of the atom, neutrons can penetrate significantly into matter. 
As neutrons penetrate through matter, two types of scattering may occur.  Elastic 
scattering occurs when the nucleus is left in the ground state, while inelastic scattering occurs 
when the nucleus is left in an excited state.  In both cases, the scattered neutron has less kinetic 
energy than the incident neutron by the amount of recoil and excitation energy (if any) of the 
scattered nucleus. The process of a neutron losing energy through scattering until it becomes in 
thermal equilibrium is denoted neutron thermalization.   The maximum energy loss occurs when 
the size of a nucleus is similar to that of a neutron.  Because of this, hydrogen is the most 
efficient moderator of neutrons. 
As neutrons thermalize, the probability that they undergo radiative capture increases.  
The radiative capture (n, γ) reaction consists of a nucleus absorbing a neutron, forming a 
compound nucleus in an excited state, which then decays to the ground state by gamma-ray 
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emission.  These gamma photons generally decay promptly (less than 10-6 s) and thus are known 
as prompt capture gamma rays.  These gamma rays have energies characteristic of the isotope, 
making it possible to identify what isotope is emitting them. 
Inelastic scattering also provides the means of identifying isotopes.  The inelastic 
scattering (n, n’) reaction occurs when a nucleus scatters a neutron, but leaves the nucleus in an 
excited state, which then decays to the ground state by gamma-ray emissions.  The inelastic 
gamma rays emitted have energies that are characteristic of the struck isotope and thus can be 
used to identify the isotope from which they were emitted. 
3.3.2. Signature-Based Radiation Scanning 
The feasibility of using the signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) method to rapidly detect 
chemical explosives at standoff distances has been demonstrated by Dunn et al. [2].  The SBRS 
method consists of active interrogation of a target by neutron and/or photon radiation beams, 
which leads to a set of responses or signatures collected by detectors on the same side of the 
target as the source.  Significantly more information about the target is obtained when both 
neutron and photon radiation beams are used.  Therefore combined use of these two is preferred.  
The set of responses collected by the detectors can then be used in a template-matching 
procedure, which provides a figure-of-merit (FOM) to distinguish between inert and explosive 
materials. 
The signatures from an unknown target collected by the detectors are used to construct a 
response vector U of J components, where J is the number of signatures used.  This response 
vector U is then compared to a library of templates, one by one.  Each template, Kt , in the library 
is a vector of J signatures from an explosive sample in a particular configuration.  Here t = 1, 
2,…, T where T is the total number of specified configurations of an explosive target.  Neutron 
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generated gamma signatures correspond to the net number of counts under a peak from a 
prompt-capture or inelastic-scatter gamma ray.  Backscatter photon signatures correspond to 
detector response spectra integrated between two energies.  Bare and cadmium covered neutron 
detectors can also provide two additional signatures that are dependent on the density and 
composition of the contents of the target.  If the vector U matches at least one of the explosive 
templates in the library to a sufficient degree, then it is presumed that the unknown target is an 
explosive.  Otherwise, it is inferred that the unknown target contains only inert materials. 
The template-matching procedure consists of using a chi-square-like figure-of-merit of 
the form [3]: 
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where Uj is the jth measured signature of an unknown sample, Ktj is the jth signature for the tth 
template, J is the number of signatures, β is a factor that scales the measured values to the 
template values, σ2 is the variance, and αj is a normalized weight factor given by 
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with ωj being a positive weight for the jth signature.  Equation (3.2) implies 
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An estimate of the standard deviation of the FOM has been derived from the widely used 
propagation of errors formula [4].  The propagation of errors formula, for a function f of two 
variables a and b, is given by 
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where σ2(a) and σ2(b) are the variances of the variables a and b, respectively, and cov(ab) is the 
covariance between this variables.  If the variables are independent of each other then the 
covariance is zero.  
It can be shown (see Appendix A) that the covariance terms between the variables Uj, Ktj, 
σ2(Uj), and σ2(Ktj) are zero.  Thus, the standard deviation of the figure of merit of Eq. (3.1) can be 
written as 
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The terms σ2(σ2(Uj)) and σ2(σ2(Ktj)) are known as the variance of the variance (VOV).  The 
partial derivatives in Eq. (3.5) are given by 
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A first approximation to the standard deviation of the FOM is obtained by neglecting the VOV 
terms.  Substituting Eq. (3.6) and Eq. (3.7) into Eq. (3.5), and neglecting the VOV terms gives 
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After simplifying, the final form of Eq. (3.10) is given by 
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A second, and more accurate, approximation to the standard deviation of the FOM that does not 
neglect the VOV terms, has also been developed, and is derived in Appendix B.  The first 
approximation, however, is the one that has been used in the SBRS formulation [3][4]. 
An additional feature of the original SBRS formulation [3][4], is that the FOM and the 
standard deviation are used to define filter functions 
   ttf   ,         (3.12) 
where λ is a constant that can be adjusted to specify the “confidence-like” interval.  If f-(λ) > fo 
for all templates in the library, where fo is a specified cut-off value, then the target is deemed an 
inert.  Similarly, if f+(λ) < fo for at least one template in the library, then the target is deemed an 
explosive.  If neither test is true, the result is inconclusive, and the target is considered a suspect.  
The values of the parameters λ and fo are established by the user to adjust for sensitivity and 
specificity.  Filter functions, however, are not used for the tiered-filter approach.  The process of 
determining if a target is an explosive or not in the tiered-filter approach is explained in section 
3.4.1. 
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The advantages of the SBRS technique over other IED detection methods include the following: 
 Rapid detection of IEDs due to a simplified process that focuses only on determining the 
presence of an explosive and not the complete stoichiometry of the contents of the target. 
 The system contains components that can be operated at remote (standoff) distances and 
the operator can be at a safe remote location. 
 Human interpretation is seldom required.  Perhaps the only exception to this is when the 
FOM is very near the cut-off value.  In such cases, additional evaluation of the target by a 
trained operator might be required.  
3.4 Tiered-Filter Approach 
3.4.1 Basic Description of the Method 
One of the most difficult challenges the SBRS technology faces is the need of a systematic 
method to build a library of explosive templates that successfully differentiates explosive and 
inert samples from among all the possible different target configurations subject to the 
constraints that exist in the field.  The size of the trunk of a car is an example of a constraint to 
which an explosive configuration is subject.  The response vector of an explosive sample is 
influenced by several factors.  In order for the template matching procedure to be successful, 
these factors must be incorporated into the explosive templates methodically.  The more an 
explosive template resembles a particular explosive sample configuration, the lower the FOM 
value should be.  The infinite number of possible configurations requires a systematic method to 
reduce the number of explosive templates necessary to distinguish between inert and explosive 
materials to a finite and manageable number.   
The tiered-filter approach is a modified version of the template-matching procedure 
described in the section 3.3.2.  This approach facilitates the construction of a library of templates 
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by exploiting the particular characteristics of nitrogen-rich explosives (i.e., the substantially 
higher concentration of nitrogen and oxygen, as well as higher density of explosives compared to 
other inert materials containing HCNO elements).  The tiered-filter approach consists of 
calculating FOM values between an unknown sample and an explosive template through stages, 
evaluating if the sample has the appropriate concentration of each element (nitrogen first, then 
oxygen, then carbon, and finally hydrogen) to contain an explosive.  If a sample fails at least one 
of these stages (ζ for that stage greater than ζN , ζO , ζC , or ζH, where ζX is the cutoff value for 
element X), it is discarded (for that specific template), and the process is repeated for the next 
explosive template in the library until all of the explosive templates have been considered.  If a 
sample passes through all the tiers of a single template (ζ for the tier smaller than ζN , ζO , ζC , or 
ζH), then it is considered an explosive. 
The current study uses only prompt-gamma or inelastic-gamma ray signatures from 
hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen.  However, backscatter photon signatures, as well as 
signatures from bare and cadmium-covered neutron detectors can be easily incorporated. 
3.4.2 Density Tier 
One problem that the tiered-filter approach has is the difficulty of distinguishing inert samples 
with a low density but with very similar chemical compositions to explosives (i.e., high 
concentration of N and O, and low concentration of C and H), from explosive samples that have 
a high density clutter in front of them.  This is because the response collected by the detectors 
from these explosive samples is reduced due to the high density clutter (usually metals with 
density higher than 3 g/cm3).  Additional information about the clutter density can prove to be 
very valuable in reducing the number of false positives in the system and improving the results in 
general.  Some photon interrogation methods have the capability to estimate the average density 
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of the target. 
The density tier is a preliminary tier that classifies explosive templates in the library 
according to their average density.  By incorporating this tier into the system, the average density 
of an unknown target can then be evaluated and compared only to the templates that belong to 
the same range that it does.  Better results can be achieved in this way, because only the 
explosive templates that have average densities similar to the unknown sample are used to 
calculate the FOM value. 
3.4.3 Artificial Templates 
The tiered filter approach uses artificial templates, which are constructed for targets that contain 
a real or characteristic explosive sample with artificial inert materials (clutter).  The artificial 
inert materials have the function of representing all the different real inert materials that can 
occur in the field.  The concentration of nitrogen, oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen in the clutter 
material changes the proportion of the (HCNO) response detected from the explosive sample.  
Therefore, the artificial inert materials in the artificial templates consist of different combinations 
of HCNO, and a filler element.  The filler element has the function of taking the place of the 
elements that are not HCNO.  The types of atoms affect the response, so filler elements 
representing different ranges of atom types should be used.  Other factors that affect the response 
collected by the detectors are the clutter density, the clutter thickness and the explosive 
thickness.  Discrete values are used to represent the range of densities of different real inert 
materials, and the range of thicknesses of clutter and explosive (sample configurations) that can 
occur in the field. 
Artificial templates, Kt, are vectors of signatures representing different explosive 
configurations. Each artificial template is divided into four sets of responses.  Each set consists 
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of the signatures corresponding to the elements H, C, N, and O.  The response vector U is also 
divided into four sets corresponding to each element.  Each signature is the net number of counts 
under a peak from a prompt-capture or inelastic-scatter gamma ray.  If a set of signatures from 
the response vector matches the corresponding set for a particular artificial template to a 
sufficient degree, then the process is repeated for the next set of signatures (tier).  The nitrogen 
(N) tier is evaluated first, then the oxygen (O) tier, then the carbon (C) tier, and finally the 
hydrogen (H) tier.  If the signature vector from an unknown sample passes all the tiers then the 
unknown is considered an explosive.  If there fails to be a match at any stage (tier) of the 
process, then it is presumed that the response vector for the unknown does not match that 
particular artificial template to a sufficient degree, and the process is repeated for the next 
artificial template in the library. 
3.4.4 Normalized Figure-of-Merit Function 
A normalized version of the FOM function is used at every tier to evaluate if a set of signatures 
from the response vector and the artificial template matches to a sufficient degree.  The 
normalized FOM is defined by 
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Thus if the net number of counts under every peak of the response vector for a particular set of 
signatures (tier) is zero, then the FOM value equals one.  If there is a perfect match between the 
response vector and the artificial template, then the FOM value is zero.  One benefit of using Eq. 
(3.13) is that only four cut-off values (one for each tier) are required for all the templates in the 
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library instead of requiring different cut-off values for each template.  The cut-off values are 
given by ζN, ζO, ζC, and ζH, which correspond to the Nitrogen, Oxygen, Carbon, and Hydrogen 
tiers, respectively.  A second benefit is that the percent that an unknown sample matches the 
explosive template can be known. 
The standard deviation of Eq. (3.13) is given by 
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3.4.5 Benefits of the Tiered-Filter Approach 
The tiered-filter approach is based on the SBRS technique, and because of this, the benefits of 
the latter system are inherent to the former one.  These benefits were mentioned at the end of 
section 3.3.2.  However, the tiered-filter approach offers additional advantages that make the 
system more robust for the field.  In summary, the benefits of the tiered-filter approach include 
the following: 
 Enables the construction of a library of templates by using artificial templates to 
represent a broad range of possible explosive configurations subject to the constraints 
imposed by the field. 
 Fewer templates are required because the chemical composition of any clutter material 
can be represented by a relatively small number of elements (HCNO, and filler elements). 
 Exploits the fact that explosive samples contain a significantly higher concentration of 
nitrogen than most other inert materials.  This prevents the effects from nitrogen (N) 
signatures to be “washed-off” by other signatures. 
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 The density tier reduces the number of false positives and improves the system in general 
by comparing unknown samples only to explosive templates that have average densities 
similar to them. 
 Cut-off values can be set individually for each tier, instead of having just one cut-off 
value for the whole template.  If a cut-off value is set too high, the probability that an 
inert sample is deemed an explosive or a suspect increases.  Therefore, having cut-off 
values for each tier gives greater flexibility in keeping them as low as required by the 
signatures of each element (H, C, N, and O) and thus minimizes the number of false 
positives. 
 Inert samples are discarded without evaluating the complete template, thus making search 
faster. 
3.5 Optimization of Parameters in Tiered-Filter Approach 
3.5.1 Sensitivity and Specificity Functions 
A key objective of this study is to calculate the parameters in the TFA that give the best results.  
The fundamental probabilistic and statistical elements of assessing performance of standoff 
bomb detection methods are sensitivity and specificity.  One reasonable solution of obtaining the 
parameters that offer the best results is to develop an objective function that is defined in terms 
of the sensitivity and specificity of the system.  However, the traditional definitions of these 
terms are not completely well suited for the TFA method, and they need to be redefined.  First 
the basic definitions are reviewed, then the reason for modifying them is given, and finally the 
new formulations for sensitivity and specificity are presented. 
To start, suppose an experimenter has an IED detection system with a binary output 
(indicating if the target contains an explosive or not), and the experimenter can verify if an 
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explosive is indeed present or not.  If the experimenter runs a number of tests, and records the 
output from the detection system and the true status of the test, then a table can be made 
reflecting the four possible outcomes.  Table 3.1 illustrates the possible combinations that can 
occur. 
 
Table 3.1 Detector Output vs. True Status of Test for IED Detection Systems 
 
Explosive 
Was Present 
No Explosive 
Was Present 
Detector Indicated 
Explosive was Present 
True Positive 
(LE) 
False Positive 
(MI) 
Detector Indicated No 
Explosive was Present 
False Negative 
(ME) 
True Negative 
(LI) 
 
 
Total Number of 
Explosive Targets 
(NE) 
Total Number of 
Non-Explosive Targets 
(NI) 
 
In Table 3.1, LE stands for explosives that were correctly labeled as explosives (True Positives), 
LI stands for inerts that were correctly labeled as inerts (True Negatives), ME stands for missed 
explosives or explosives that were incorrectly labeled as inerts (False Negatives), and MI stands 
for missed inerts or inerts that were incorrectly labeled as explosives (False Positives).  The total 
number of explosive targets and non-explosive targets are represented by NE and NI respectively. 
 As can be deduced from Table 3.1, the sum of True Positives (LE) and False Negatives 
(ME) equals the total number of explosive targets.  Similarly, the sum of False Positives (MI) and 
True Negatives (LI) equal the total number of non-explosive targets.  The traditional 
mathematical definition of sensitivity and specificity are given by 
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3.5.2 Objective Function 
The objective function that has been defined in this study to evaluate the performance of the 
method is given by 
 
ppnn            (3.10)
 
1with  pn  , 
where ωn and ωp are weight factors specified by the user to give more value in the optimization 
process to the sensitivity or the specificity, respectively.  Combining equations 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 
gives 
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As can be seen, this objective function depends on the number of true positives, false 
positives, number of explosives and number of inerts.  The first two variables, in turn, depend on 
the cut-off values for the different tiers and the weight factors for the different signatures.  
Therefore, the objective function Ω is a multidimensional function that cannot be simply 
optimized. 
3.5.3 Simulated Annealing Algorithm based on Downhill Simplex Method 
An important component of the present research is to determine the values of the parameters that 
give the best performance of the tiered-filter approach technique, and the method through which 
these values were obtained.  The basic statistical and probabilistic elements of assessing 
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performance of standoff bomb detection methodologies are given by the sensitivity and 
specificity of the method.  Because of this, an objective function that is a function of the 
sensitivity and specificity was defined, and a suitable optimization method was chosen.  The goal 
is to find the values of the parameters that maximize this function.  It should be noted however, 
that because the given methods in the book Numerical Recipes in Fortran 77 are minimizing 
algorithms, the negative form of the objective function was evaluated in the codes for 
convenience.  The objective function was defined in section 3.5.2. 
 Because of the normalization condition of Eq. (3.3), there are only five independent 
weight factors, four for nitrogen and one for oxygen.  Thus, the objective function of Eq. (3.11) 
is actually a function of ten independent variables, ωn , ζN , ζO , ζC , ζH , αN1, αN2, αN3, αN4, αO1.  
Even though the partial derivatives of the objective function with respect to LE, and MI exist and 
are continuous; the partial derivatives with respect to the independent variables may not be 
continuous.  Therefore, a multidimensional optimization method that does not require the 
computation of first derivatives is sought.  The optimization method that has been selected in this 
research is a combination of simulated annealing and the downhill simplex method.  Generally 
speaking, simulated annealing is the fundamental method being used, and it’s goal is to find the 
global minimum of the objective function.  The downhill simplex method has the function of 
increasing the efficiency of converging to a local minimum.  Both methods will now be 
described.  First, the downhill simplex method, then the simulated annealing method, and finally 
the combined versions of the two, are presented. 
3.5.3.1 Downhill Simplex Method 
The downhill simplex method is a multidimensional minimization method that requires 
evaluations only of functions, not derivatives.  It was developed by Nelder and Mead [38].  
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Unlike most optimization methods, the downhill simplex method does not make explicit use of 
one-dimensional optimization algorithms as a part of its computational strategy.  Instead it uses a 
geometrical figure called a simplex to move through N-dimensional space in search of the 
smallest (optimal) value. 
A simplex is a geometrical figure in N-dimensional space consisting of N + 1 vertices 
and their interconnected line segments.  For example, in two-dimensional space, a simplex is a 
triangle; in three-dimensional space it is a tetrahedron; etc.  Only non-degenerate simplexes are 
used in the downhill simplex method (i.e; simplexes that enclose a finite inner N-dimensional 
volume).  The N + 1 vertices in the simplex are given by  
,,...,2,1, NiePP ioi 

  
where Po is the initial starting point selected by the user (any point), ei’s are N unit vectors, λ is a 
constant that is the users’ estimate of the characteristic length, and Pi are the rest of the points in 
the simplex. 
The downhill simplex method consists of making the vertices in the simplex move through 
the complex N-dimensional topography of the independent variables, evaluating the objective 
function at the vertices, and moving downhill, until it encounters values of the independent 
variables that give at least a local minimum of the objective function. 
There are four types of movement that the vertices follow.  These are reflection, reflection 
and expansion, contraction, and multiple-contraction.  These movements depend on the position 
of three particular points of the simplex, which are: 
 Highest point (vertex of the simplex where the function is the highest) 
 Next highest point (vertex of the simplex where the function is the second highest) 
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 Lowest point (vertex of the simplex where the function is the lowest) 
The goal of the movements is to find points smaller than the highest points and next highest 
points and replace them.  The first movement a simplex performs is a reflection (or mirror 
image) of the highest point through the other N points of the simplex.  If the reflected point is 
smaller than the lowest point, then an expansion (extrapolation) along the line of reflection is 
made to perhaps find an even smaller point.  If the reflected point is larger than the second 
highest point, then a contraction along the line of reflection is made.  If this last point is still 
higher than the previous higher value, then movement along that line doesn’t seem to improve 
the situation, and a multiple contraction around the lowest value is then performed. 
In essence, the points that are evaluated first are the ones along the line of reflection of 
the original highest point.  If there is no improvement along this line (through reflection, and 
contraction), then a multiple contraction around the lowest point is performed, and the process is 
repeated again.  If there is an improvement along this line (through reflection) then an expansion 
is performed and the process is repeated again.  This algorithm will converge to a local minimum 
when the difference between the high point and the low point of the simplex is smaller than a 
tolerance value provided by the user. 
3.5.3.2 Simulated Annealing 
Simulated annealing is a multidimensional minimization technique that is suitable for large scale 
problems, and that has the advantage of not getting easily stuck in local minima.  It requires only 
function evaluations, no derivatives.  It is particularly powerful for combinatorial optimization, 
and has effectively solved the famous traveling salesman problem [39]. 
The method resembles the process of annealing, where at high temperatures the 
molecules of a metal move freely with respect to one another.  If cooling occurs slowly, thermal 
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mobility is lost, atoms are often able to align themselves, and the system reaches a state of 
minimum energy.  If quick cooling or “quenching” occurs the system ends up in a higher energy 
state.  So the analogy is that while other optimization methods go greedily downhill (quick 
cooling) and can get stuck in a local minimum; simulated annealing incorporates a mechanism 
that, once in a while, allows it to get out of local minima (slow cooling) and encounter better 
results, increasing the chances of ending up at the global minimum.  The use of the simulated 
annealing algorithm, however, does not guarantee a global minimum will be reached. 
Metropolis [40] was the first to develop an algorithm based on the concept of annealing.  
The method consists of offering a succession of energy options to a simulated thermodynamic 
system.  The system will change its configuration from an energy state E1 to an energy state E2 
with a probability of 
 kTEEp /)(exp 12   
where k (Boltzman constant) is a constant of nature that relates energy to temperature and T is 
the temperature of the system. 
In the case when E2 < E1, the probability is larger than one.  In such a case the probability 
is arbitrarily set equal to one, and as a result of this, the system always takes the smaller 
configuration (E2).  This is the mechanism that allows the simulated algorithm of always taking a 
downhill step while still having a chance of taking uphill steps from time to time.  If E2 > E1, 
then 0 < p < 1 and an uphill step is taken.  This uphill step gives the method a chance of getting 
out from a local minimum.  As the iterations continue, the temperature of the system decreases 
according to an annealing schedule.  A reduction in the parameter T reduces the probability of an 
uphill step, and eventually (if the reduction of the temperature is slow enough) the system will 
converge to a good local minimum. 
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The main ideas of the Metropolis algorithm are also applicable to optimization process of 
continuous variables, and the four components required for the algorithm are the following: 
 An objective function f(x), where x is an N-dimensional vector of the N independent 
variables.  This function is the analog of the energy of the system, whose minimization is 
the goal of the procedure. 
 Possible system configurations.  The different system configurations are represented by 
the function f(x) evaluated at different values x. 
 A generator of random changes in the configuration.  Which means there must be a 
procedure for taking a random step from x to x+Δx. 
 A control parameter T (analog of temperature) and an annealing schedule.  The annealing 
schedule tells how often and by how much the parameter T must be lowered.  For 
example, the parameter T can be held constant for 100N reconfigurations, or for 10N 
successful reconfigurations, whichever comes first.  Once this occurs, the parameter T is 
decreased, and the process is repeated until efforts to reduce the objective function 
become discouraging. 
The objective function, its variables, and the annealing schedule are specified by the user 
(with some trial and error being the most difficult part in deciding the most efficient annealing 
schedule).  However, the generator of random changes in the configuration does present a 
significant problem.  A key factor of the Metropolis simulated annealing algorithm, is that the 
mechanism generally takes a step downhill in the optimization process, while sometimes taking a 
step uphill.  For that reason, an internal mechanism that always takes a downhill step in an 
efficient way, while sometimes taking an uphill one is required. 
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3.5.3.3 Combined Methodology 
The approach taken in by the authors of Numerical Recipes in Fortran 77 is to modify the 
downhill simplex method so that it generally takes a downhill step, while sometimes taking a 
step uphill.  This is done by adding random numbers proportional to the annealing temperature 
(thermal fluctuations) to the current function value at the vertices of the simplex (current energy 
state, E1).  Random numbers proportional to the annealing temperature are then subtracted from 
the function value at the new proposed vertix of the simplex (new energy state, E2).  In this way, 
if the original value of the new energy state (E2) is smaller than the current energy state (E1), 
then subtracting a positive random number from E2, while adding a positive random number to 
E1, would still leave E2 smaller than E1.  As a result, a downhill step would generally be taken.  
However, if the original value of E2 is larger than E1, then because of the subtracting and adding 
of positive random numbers to E2 and E1, respectively, there is a chance that the modified value 
of E2 would emerge smaller than the modified value of E1.  Consequently, there is a chance that 
an uphill step is taken.  The chance of an uphill step decreases proportionally to the annealing 
temperature, which in turn decreases according to an annealing schedule specified by the user. 
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CHAPTER 4 - SIMULATION PROCEDURE 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
In this study, computer simulations, instead of real experiments, were used to test the tiered-filter 
implementation of the SBRS method.  This Chapter discusses reasons why computer simulations 
were utilized, and explains the procedure employed to produce the data necessary to evaluate the 
performance of the method.  The Chapter starts by describing the code used to run the computer 
simulations.  It gives a brief description of how the MCNP code works and why the results 
produced by it can be trusted.  It also talks about how the data were post-processed.  Then the 
geometry of the simulation is described.  All the important components of the simulation, as well 
as the different configurations are portrayed.  The section that follows identifies the explosive 
and inert samples that were used.  The method through which the artificial explosive templates 
were made, including their compositions and densities, is discussed in the final section. 
4.2 MCNP Code for Simulation 
The code used in this study to test the feasibility of the tiered-filter approach was the Monte 
Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code.  MCNP is a particle transport code developed and maintained at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory.  It is an internationally recognized code for analyzing the 
transport of neutrons, gamma rays, electrons, and coupled particles, including secondary gamma 
rays resulting from neutron interactions.  The code undergoes continuous development at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, and new versions are released periodically.  The version used in 
this study is MCNP5. 
 MCNP employs the Monte Carlo methodology to perform simulations of different 
particles.  In essence, the Monte Carlo method is a highly flexible and powerful numerical 
integration technique that uses sample means to estimate population means.  A wide variety of 
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direct and inverse problems can be solved using this methodology.  These problems can be posed 
as numerical quadratures (problems formulated as integrals) or as simulations (problems where 
the integral formulation is not specified).  The method is based on two powerful mathematical 
theorems, which are the strong law of large numbers and the central limit theorem.  These 
theorems are used to obtain an estimate of an expected value (strong law of large numbers) and 
the corresponding uncertainty of the estimate (the central limit theorem).  Therefore, Monte 
Carlo simulation provides an estimate of what the answer to the problem is, and how good that 
estimate is. 
 In order to simulate an experiment in MCNP the user creates an input file.  This file 
contains all the necessary information to run the simulation.  The input file consists of the title 
card, cell cards, surface cards, and data cards.  The term card, historically a punch card, refers to 
a code line in the input file.  Additionally, the cell cards, surface cards, and data cards are also 
referred to as Block 1, Block 2, and Block 3, respectively.  The title card consists of only one 
line with the title given to the simulation by the user.  The cell cards (Block 1) together with the 
surface cards (Block 2) have the function of specifying the geometry of the problem.  The data 
cards (Block 3) provide all the other problem specifications other than the geometry.  These 
include the materials used, type of particles, radiation sources, cross section libraries, how results 
are tallied, and so forth. 
 The use of powerful computers to perform the simulation enables MCNP to run a large 
number of particle histories, and thus provide a very precise answer.  The accuracy of the nuclear 
physics theory and the cross sectional data incorporated into the MCNP code has been 
thoroughly tested by professional experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory and elsewhere.  
The code has been used to design nuclear reactors and other complex systems.  Therefore, the 
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accuracy and the precision of the results from the simulations obtained by running the MCNP 
code can be trusted, if enough histories are run, to test feasibility of the tiered-filter approach to 
the SBRS technique. 
 Running computer simulations instead of real-life experiments has the purpose of testing 
the feasibility of a method in a much more economical, safe, and fast manner.  If a method 
proves to be feasible, then more expensive real-life experiments can be performed to test it under 
field conditions.  Because this study is in the early stages of testing the feasibility of the tiered-
filter approach, computer simulations based in MCNP5 are appropriate. 
4.3 Simulation Geometry 
Ten different types of target geometric configurations were simulated and analyzed using the 
MCNP5 code. The different configurations try to isolate the effects of the clutter chemical 
composition, clutter thickness, position of the explosive and clutter, and explosive volume. For 
each geometric configuration, 102 samples were generated.  Half of the targets consisted of an 
explosive cyclonite (RDX) sample with 51 different clutter materials in front of it, and the other 
half consisted only of the same inert material as both the sample and the clutter. 
All the targets were inside a thin aluminum box.  The aluminum box has the function of 
hiding the contents.  It was 0.2 cm thick and the dimensions were of 1 m on each side.  For all 
cases, the clutter material had a width of 96 cm and a height of 20 cm, and the explosive had a 
width of 15.24 cm and a height of 20 cm.  A neutron beam, aligned with the clutter and the 
explosive sample, was placed 50 cm in front of the aluminum box.  The energy of the neutrons 
was 14.1 MeV (representative of a collimated D-T neutron generator), and the number of source 
particle histories was 2×107.  A point detector was placed 35 cm directly above the neutron 
beam.  The width of the energy bins for the tally was 4-keV.  This width was selected to 
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resemble the energy resolution of some HPGe detectors.  A total of nine prompt-gamma and 
inelastic-gamma ray signatures from hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen were used in the 
simulations.  The signatures used in this study are shown in Appendix E.  The simulations 
assumed the source, detector, and target were all in a vacuum.  Figure 4.1 shows schematically a 
side view of the simulation setup.  The different types of configuration are described in Table 
4.1.  The different values used for the clutter thickness, the explosive thickness, and the distance 
from the neutron source to the clutter are given by the variables tc , te and ds, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Schematic of the experimental setup (side view).  The sample contained either the 
explosive cyclonite (RDX) or the same material as the clutter material.  The target is bombarded 
by a neutron beam, and the response is collected by a point detector. 
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Table 4.1 Distance from the Source, Clutter thickness, and Explosive Thickness for the Different 
Geometric Configurations Simulated in this Study 
Configurations 
Distance from 
Source ds (cm) 
Clutter Thickness 
 tc (cm) 
Explosive Thickness 
te (cm) 
Configuration 1 74 10 11 
Configuration 2 69 15 11 
Configuration 3 64 20 11 
Configuration 4 59 25 11 
Configuration 5 54 30 11 
Configuration 6 69 10 16 
Configuration 7 64 10 21 
Configuration 8 59 10 26 
Configuration 9 64 10 11 
Configuration 10 54 10 11 
 
4.4 Explosive and Inert Samples 
A wide range of inert materials were selected to test the feasibility of the method.  These 
materials where used as clutter in front of the explosive cyclonite, and each material was also 
used as clutter and sample.  Table 4.2 shows the 51 different materials that were used as clutter 
and as inert samples. 
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Table 4.2 List of Materials Used as Clutter and as Inert Samples 
 
1 Air 18 Gasoline 35 Polyurethane 
2 Aluminum 19 Glass 36 Propane 
3 Antifreeze 20 Granite 37 Rubber 
4 Ash 21 Herbicide 1 38 Salt 
5 Borax 22 Herbicide 2 39 Soap 
6 Bricks 23 Herbicide 3 40 Soil 
7 Carbon 24 K Hydroxide 41 Soy 
8 Cardboard 25 Lead 42 Steel 
9 Ceramic 26 Limestone 43 Styrofoam 
10 Cherrywood 27 Lucite 44 Sugar 
11 Concrete 28 Nickel 45 Tissue 
12 Copper 29 Nylon 46 Titanium 
13 Cotton 30 Petroleum 47 Void 
14 Cyanurate 31 Plexiglass 48 Water 
15 Ethanol 32 Polyethylene 49 Wax 
16 Fertilizer A 33 Polypropylene 50 Woodoak 
17 Fertilizer B 34 Polystyrene 51 Zirconium 
 
4.5 Explosive Artificial Templates 
4.5.1 Chemical Composition 
Artificial templates were generated for each configuration.  These templates assumed a cyclonite 
explosive sample with artificial inert material in front of it.  The artificial inert materials in front 
of the explosive consist of different possible combinations of HCNO, and a filler element.  The 
filler element has the function of taking the place of the elements that are not HCNO.  Section 
4.5.2 gives more details about the function of filler elements in the construction of artificial 
material. 
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Artificial materials have the function of representing all the different real inert materials 
that can occur in the field.  The discrete values that were used to represent the concentration of 
the different elements were all multiples of 10%.  Whenever the sum of the concentrations of H, 
C, N, and O did not add up to a 100% a filler element was used.  Table 4.3 shows the chemical 
composition of the artificial templates that required a filler element.  Similarly, Table 4.4 shows 
the chemical composition of the artificial templates that did not require a filler element.  The 
combinations chosen in these Tables are the values that are closest to the HCNO concentration of 
the inert materials in Table 4.2.  It should be noted that the artificial inert materials should not 
resemble explosives; therefore they only contain a maximum of 20% nitrogen at lower densities, 
and none for higher densities (densities greater than 3 g/cm3). 
4.5.2 Filler Elements and Density 
The filler element used in generating artificial materials has the function of taking the place of 
the elements that are not HCNO.  The filler materials used were selected by trial and error among 
elements that did not have interference gammas.  Elements with properties that would have 
offered difficulty (such as the high neutron absorption rate of boron) were discarded.  Lithium 
(Li), fluorine (F), phosphorus (P), and chromium (Cr), were used as filler elements.  A higher 
clutter density implied a higher probability that an interaction will occur with the clutter elements 
and the smaller the chance they will interact with the explosive.  This means that the density of 
the material also affects the response of the target; therefore discrete values were used to 
represent them. Densities of 0.25 g/cm3 (Very Low Density), 1 g/cm3 (Low Density), 2.25 g/cm3 
(Medium Density), and 7 g/cm3 (High Density) were used to represent the range of densities of 
the different real inert materials. 
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 In order to produce artificial templates that resemble real inert materials well, only the 
combinations among filler elements and densities shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 were used.  
This was done to avoid having unrealistic materials that possess, for example, a very light 
element with a very high density.  Additionally, the artificial templates were divided into lower 
density templates (Table 4.5) and higher density templates (Table 4.6), which enables the use of 
a preliminary density tier, such that unknown samples are compared only with the templates that 
correspond to a particular density range. 
 
Table 4.3 Chemical Composition of Artificial Explosive Samples 
with their Filler Element 
 Nitrogen Oxygen Carbon Hydrogen Filler Element 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
2 0% 0% 30% 60% 10% 
3 0% 10% 30% 50% 10% 
4 0% 20% 0% 0% 80% 
5 0% 20% 20% 50% 10% 
6 0% 30% 0% 30% 40% 
7 0% 40% 0% 50% 10% 
8 0% 40% 10% 0% 50% 
9 0% 50% 0% 0% 50% 
10 0% 60% 0% 0% 40% 
11 0% 60% 20% 0% 20% 
12 0% 70% 0% 0% 30% 
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Table 4.4 Chemical Composition of Artificial Explosive Samples 
without Filler Element 
 Nitrogen Oxygen Carbon Hydrogen 
1 0% 0% 100% 0% 
2 0% 0% 30% 70% 
3 0% 0% 40% 60% 
4 0% 0% 50% 50% 
5 0% 10% 20% 70% 
6 0% 10% 30% 60% 
7 0% 20% 20% 60% 
8 0% 20% 30% 50% 
9 0% 20% 40% 40% 
10 0% 30% 0% 70% 
11 0% 80% 10% 10% 
12 10% 0% 30% 60% 
13 10% 0% 40% 50% 
14 10% 10% 30% 50% 
15 10% 10% 40% 40% 
16 10% 10% 50% 30% 
17 20% 0% 30% 50% 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table 4.5 Filler Elements and their Corresponding Densities 
For the Lower Density Tier  
Density Value 
(g/cm3) 
Range 
(g/cm3) 
Filler element 
Very Low Density 0.25 0 – 0.5 Li 
Very Low Density 0.25 0 – 0.5 F 
Low Density 1.0 0.5 – 1.5 Li 
Low Density 1.0 0.5 – 1.5 F 
Low Density 1.0 0.5 – 1.5 P 
Medium Density 2.25 1.5 – 3.0 F 
 
Table 4.6 Filler Elements and their Corresponding Densities 
For the Higher Density Tier 
Density Value 
(g/cm3) 
Range 
(g/cm3) 
Filler Element 
Medium Density 2.25 1.5 – 3.0 Cr 
High Density 7.0 3.0 – 11.0 P 
High Density 7.0 3.0 – 11.0 Cr 
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CHAPTER 5 – EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, the results obtained by applying the tiered-filter approach described in Chapter 3 
to the MCNP simulations discussed in Chapter 4 are presented.  The performance of the tiered-
filter approach is evaluated by using the objective function defined in section 3.5.2.  The 
sensitivity and the specificity of the method are also calculated.  In all sections, the results are 
also obtained without using the HCNO tiers.  For ease of reference, these results are labeled non-
tiered approach.  This was done to observe if the use of tiers does indeed improve the 
performance of the system compared to the non-tiered method.  The results shown in this 
Chapter are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 The first section discusses the library of explosive templates used in all the results shown.  
The library consists of 126 normalized templates, of which three are applied to high density 
targets (densities above 3 g/cm3) and the rest are applied to lower density targets.  All the 
templates in the library were constructed from the same geometric configuration, which is 
labeled as the default configuration.  The next section shows the materials used as clutter in front 
of the sample, either the explosive cyclonite or inert materials.  A total of 51 different materials 
are included. 
 Section 5.3 shows the results obtained by applying the library of templates to inert and 
explosive samples that have the same geometric configuration as the templates in the library.  
The goal of this section was to see how effectively the artificial materials (clutter) used in the 
explosive templates work when applied to the real materials employed in the explosive and inert 
targets, everything else been equal. 
 The next three sections try to isolate the effects of changing the position of the target, 
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increasing the explosive volume, and increasing the clutter thickness, respectively.  The 
templates in the library (which were developed for the default configuration) are applied to 
targets of different geometric configurations.  This is done to see how well the templates in the 
tiered-filter approach handle targets that have slightly different geometric configurations, and to 
estimate the limitations in how well they work. 
 The last section applies the library of templates to all the target samples, regardless of 
their geometric configuration.  A total of 1,020 samples are used in this last section to test the 
performance of the tiered-filter approach. 
5.2 Library of Explosive Templates 
The library of explosive templates used in these results is composed of 126 artificial templates.  
All of them were developed for the same geometric configuration.  This geometric configuration 
has been labeled in this study as the default configuration.  Only 3 of the 126 templates are 
applied to the samples that have densities higher than 3 g/cm3.  These templates consist only of 
the filler elements (density values and filler elements listed on Table 5.2, with chemical 
composition #1 of Table 5.3).  The other 123 templates are applied to the samples that have 
densities lower than 3 g/cm3.  This permits a crude application of the density tier described in 
Section 3.4.2.   
The artificial clutter in front of the cyclonite explosive is, in the default configuration, 74 
cm from the neutron source, the clutter is 10 cm thick, the distance between the clutter and the 
explosive is 1 cm, and the thickness of the explosive is 10 cm (total volume of 3,048 cm3).  The 
filler elements used, their corresponding densities, and the chemical composition of the clutter in 
front of the templates, are shown in tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. 
 
51 
 
Table 5.1.  Density Values and Filler Elements for Templates in the Lower Density 
Density Value Range Filler element 
Very Low Density 0.25 0 – 0.5 Li 
Very Low Density 0.25 0 – 0.5 F 
Low Density 1.0 0.5 – 1.5 Li 
Low Density 1.0 0.5 – 1.5 F 
Low Density 1.0 0.5 – 1.5 P 
Medium Density 2.25 1.5 – 3.0 F 
 
Table 5.2. Density Values and Filler Elements for Templates in the Higher Density Tier 
Density Value Range Filler Element 
Medium Density 2.25 1.5 – 3.0 Cr 
High Density 7.0 3.0 – 11.0 P 
High Density 7.0 3.0 – 11.0 Cr 
 
Table 5.3.  Chemical Composition of Clutter Material with Filler Elements of Templates 
 Nitrogen Oxygen Carbon Hydrogen Filler Element 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
2 0% 0% 30% 60% 10% 
3 0% 10% 30% 50% 10% 
4 0% 20% 0% 0% 80% 
5 0% 20% 20% 50% 10% 
6 0% 30% 0% 30% 40% 
7 0% 40% 0% 50% 10% 
8 0% 40% 10% 0% 50% 
9 0% 50% 0% 0% 50% 
10 0% 60% 0% 0% 40% 
11 0% 60% 20% 0% 20% 
12 0% 70% 0% 0% 30% 
 
 
52 
 
Table 5.4. Chemical Composition of Clutter Material without Filler Elements of Templates 
 Nitrogen Oxygen Carbon Hydrogen 
1 0% 0% 100% 0% 
2 0% 0% 30% 70% 
3 0% 0% 40% 60% 
4 0% 0% 50% 50% 
5 0% 10% 20% 70% 
6 0% 10% 30% 60% 
7 0% 20% 20% 60% 
8 0% 20% 30% 50% 
9 0% 20% 40% 40% 
10 0% 30% 0% 70% 
11 0% 80% 10% 10% 
12 10% 0% 30% 60% 
13 10% 0% 40% 50% 
14 10% 10% 30% 50% 
15 10% 10% 40% 40% 
16 10% 10% 50% 30% 
17 20% 0% 30% 50% 
 
5.3 Materials Used for Explosive Clutter and Inert Samples 
A wide range of materials was selected to test the tiered-filter approach.  A total of 51 different 
materials, with densities ranging between 0.0012 g/cm3 to 11.35 g/cm3 were used as inert targets 
and as clutter in front of the explosives.  These materials were employed in all the samples of the 
different geometrical configurations utilized to evaluate the performance of the tiered-filter 
approach. Because there are ten different geometric configurations, the total sum of inert and 
explosive targets equals 1020.  Table 5.5 contains the list of materials used in this study. 
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Table 5.5. List of Materials Used as Clutter and as Inert Samples 
 
1 Air 18 Gasoline 35 Polyurethane 
2 Aluminum 19 Glass 36 Propane 
3 Antifreeze 20 Granite 37 Rubber 
4 Ash 21 Herbicide 1 38 Salt 
5 Borax 22 Herbicide 2 39 Soap 
6 Bricks 23 Herbicide 3 40 Soil 
7 Carbon 24 K Hydroxide 41 Soy 
8 Cardboard 25 Lead 42 Steel 
9 Ceramic 26 Limestone 43 Styrofoam 
10 Cherrywood 27 Lucite 44 Sugar 
11 Concrete 28 Nickel 45 Tissue 
12 Copper 29 Nylon 46 Titanium 
13 Cotton 30 Petroleum 47 Void 
14 Cyanurate 31 Plexiglass 48 Water 
15 Ethanol 32 Polyethylene 49 Wax 
16 Fertilizer A 33 Polypropylene 50 Woodoak 
17 Fertilizer B 34 Polystyrene 51 Zirconium 
 
5.4 Results for Samples with the Same Geometrical Configuration as Library Templates 
The results shown in this section have the purpose of fixing all the variable factors that can affect 
the response of a target, and focus only on the chemical composition and density of the clutter.  
This was done to test how well the artificial materials used as clutter in the artificial explosive 
templates perform. 
The geometrical configuration of the targets is the same as the one for the templates in 
the library.  For the explosive samples, the clutter in front of the cyclonite explosive is 74 cm 
from the neutron source, the clutter is 10 cm thick, the distance between the clutter and the 
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explosive is 1 cm, and the thickness of the explosive is 10 cm.  For the inert samples, the same 
configuration applies, keeping in mind that the volume occupied by the explosive is replaced 
with the same inert material as the clutter. 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 show the number of True Positives, False Negatives, True 
Negatives, and False Positives, as well as the Sensitivity, Specificity, and objective function 
Omega obtained for this set of targets using the tiered-filter approach and the non-tiered 
approach, respectively.  Each table consists of the results for the lower density tier, the higher 
density tier, as well as the final results.  The cut-off values for each tier of the TFA and the cut-
off value for the non-tiered approach, as well as the False Negatives and False Positives for both 
methods are given in Appendix D1. 
 
Table 5.6.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with the Same Geometrical 
Configuration as the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 44 5 49 
False Negatives 1 1 2 
True Negatives 42 6 48 
False Positives 3 0 3 
Sensitivity 0.978 0.833 0.961 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.941 
Ω 0.956 0.917 0.951 
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Table 5.7.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with the Same 
Geometrical Configuration as the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 44 6 50 
False Negatives 1 0 1 
True Negatives 40 6 46 
False Positives 5 0 5 
Sensitivity 0.978 1 0.980 
Specificity 0.889 1 0.902 
Ω 0.933 1 0.941 
 
5.5 Results for Samples at Different Distances from the Source 
In this section, the goal was to isolate and study the effect of moving the target to a position 
closer to the source.  Two geometrical configurations different from the default configuration 
were simulated, one where the clutter and the explosive are both moved 10 cm closer to the 
source, and the other one where the clutter and the explosive are both moved 20 cm closer to the 
source.  The purpose was to observe how well the artificial templates for a single separation 
perform for different separations in the tiered-filter approach. 
Table 5.8 through Table 5.11 show the number of True Positives, False Negatives, True 
Negatives, False Positives, the Sensitivity, Specificity, and the objective function Omega 
implementing the tiered-filter approach and the non-tiered approach to the targets moved 10 cm 
and 20 cm closer to the source.  The same parameters are shown in Table 5.12 and 5.13 for the 
combined results obtained by applying the library of templates to the targets moved 10 cm and 
20 cm, as well as the default configuration targets, for a total of 182 samples.  Each table consists 
of the results for the lower density tier, the higher density tier, as well as the final results.  The 
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cut-off values for each tier of the TFA and the cut-off value for the non-tiered approach, as well 
as the samples labeled False Negatives and False Positives for both methods are given in 
Appendix D2. 
 
Table 5.8.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples 10 cm 
Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 44 5 49 
False Negatives 1 1 2 
True Negatives 42 6 48 
False Positives 3 0 3 
Sensitivity 0.978 0.833 0.961 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.941 
Ω 0.956 0.917 0.951 
  
 
Table 5.9.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples 10 cm 
Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 44 6 50 
False Negatives 1 0 1 
True Negatives 35 6 41 
False Positives 10 0 10 
Sensitivity 0.978 1 0.980 
Specificity 0.778 1 0.804 
Ω 0.878 1 0.892 
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Table 5.10.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples 20 cm 
Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 43 6 49 
False Negatives 2 0 2 
True Negatives 42 6 48 
False Positives 3 0 3 
Sensitivity 0.956 1 0.961 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.941 
Ω 0.944 1 0.951 
 
  
Table 5.11.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples 20 cm 
Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 37 6 43 
False Negatives 8 0 8 
True Negatives 33 6 39 
False Positives 12 0 12 
Sensitivity 0.822 1 0.843 
Specificity 0.733 1 0.765 
Ω 0.789 1 0.804 
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Table 5.12.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples from the Default 
Configuration as well as Samples 10 cm and 20 cm Closer to the Source 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 131 6 137 
False Negatives 4 0 4 
True Negatives 126 6 132 
False Positives 9 0 9 
Sensitivity 0.970 1 0.972 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.936 
Ω 0.952 1 0.954 
 
Table 5.13.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the Default 
Configuration as well as Samples 10 cm and 20 cm Closer to the Source 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 111 18 117 
False Negatives 24 0 24 
True Negatives 114 18 120 
False Positives 21 0 21 
Sensitivity 0.822 1 0.830 
Specificity 0.844 1 0.851 
Ω 0.833 1 0.840 
 
5.6 Results for Samples with Different Explosive Volume 
The results presented in this section help isolate the effect caused by increasing the explosive 
volume.  Three geometrical configurations different from the default configuration were 
simulated.  The clutter position (74 cm from the neutron source), the clutter thickness (10 cm), 
and the distance between the clutter and the explosive (1 cm) are the same for these three 
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configurations as for the default one.  The cross sectional area of the explosive remains the same 
for these configurations as the default one, but the explosive thicknesses are 15 cm (4572 cm3), 
20 cm (6096 cm3), and 25 cm (7620 cm3), respectively.  The objective was to see if the artificial 
templates are flexible enough to identify explosive targets that possess explosive volumes larger 
than the ones for which the templates were originally designed. 
Table 5.14 through Table 5.19 show the number of True Positives, False Negatives, True 
Negatives, False Positives, the Sensitivity, Specificity, and the objective function Omega 
employing the tiered-filter approach and the non-tiered approach to targets having explosive 
volumes of 4,572 cm3, 6,096 cm3, and 7,620 cm3.  The same parameters are shown in Table 5.20 
and 5.21 for the combined results obtained by applying the library of templates to the previous 
mentioned targets in addition to the default configuration targets, for a total of 408 samples.  
Each table consists of the results for the lower density tier, the higher density tier, as well as the 
final results.  Cut-off values for each tier of the TFA and the cut-off value for the non-tiered 
approach, False Negatives, and False Positives for both methods are given in Appendix D3. 
Table 5.14.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 45 6 51 
False Negatives 0 0 0 
True Negatives 42 6 48 
False Positives 3 0 3 
Sensitivity 1 1 1 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.941 
Ω 0.967 1 0.971 
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Table 5.15.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 44 6 50 
False Negatives 1 0 1 
True Negatives 35 5 40 
False Positives 10 1 11 
Sensitivity 0.978 1 0.980 
Specificity 0.778 0.833 0.784 
Ω 0.878 0.917 0.882 
 
 
Table 5.16.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 45 4 49 
False Negatives 0 2 2 
True Negatives 41 6 47 
False Positives 4 0 4 
Sensitivity 1 0.667 0.961 
Specificity 0.911 1 0.922 
Ω 0.956 0.833 0.941 
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Table 5.17.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 44 6 50 
False Negatives 1 0 1 
True Negatives 32 5 37 
False Positives 13 1 14 
Sensitivity 0.978 1 0.980 
Specificity 0.711 0.833 0.725 
Ω 0.844 0.917 0.853 
 
 
Table 5.18.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 45 5 50 
False Negatives 0 1 1 
True Negatives 42 6 48 
False Positives 3 0 3 
Sensitivity 1 0.833 0.980 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.941 
Ω 0.967 0.917 0.961 
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Table 5.19.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 32 6 38 
False Negatives 13 0 13 
True Negatives 33 6 39 
False Positives 12 0 12 
Sensitivity 0.711 1 0.745 
Specificity 0.733 1 0.765 
Ω 0.722 1 0.755 
 
 
Table 5.20.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples from the Default 
Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 179 18 197 
False Negatives 1 6 7 
True Negatives 168 24 192 
False Positives 12 0 12 
Sensitivity 0.994 0.750 0.966 
Specificity 0.933 1 0.941 
Ω 0.964 0.875 0.953 
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Table 5.21.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the Default 
Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 166 24 190 
False Negatives 14 0 14 
True Negatives 132 24 156 
False Positives 48 0 48 
Sensitivity 0.922 1 0.925 
Specificity 0.733 1 0.742 
Ω 0.828 1 0.833 
 
5.7 Results for Samples with Different Clutter Thickness 
In this section, the effect of clutter thickness was isolated by developing configurations with 
clutter thicknesses larger than the default case.  Four geometrical configurations different from 
the default configuration were simulated.  The thickness of the clutter in these configurations is 
increased from the front.  Therefore, the explosive remains with the same volume (3,048 cm3), in 
the same location, and at the same distance from the clutter (1 cm) as the default case, but the 
clutter increases in thickness and at the same time the front part of the clutter gets closer to the 
neutron source.  The clutter thicknesses for these four configurations are 15 cm, 20 cm, 25 cm, 
and 30 cm.  The goal is to study how well the artificial templates perform when applied to clutter 
thicknesses larger than they were designed and what their limitations are. 
The number of True Positives, False Negatives, True Negatives, False Positives, the 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and the objective function Omega calculated using the tiered-filter 
approach and the non-tiered approach to this set of targets are shown in Tables 5.22 through 
Table 5.29.  These parameters are also shown in Table 5.30 and 5.31 for the combined results 
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obtained by applying the library of templates to the previous mentioned targets in addition to the 
default configuration targets, for a total of 510 samples.  Each table consists of the results for the 
lower density tier, the higher density tier, as well as the final results.  The cut-off values for each 
tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off value for the non-tiered approach, and the 
samples labeled False Negatives and False Positives for both methods are given in Appendix D4. 
 
Table 5.22.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 45 6 51 
False Negatives 0 0 0 
True Negatives 40 6 46 
False Positives 5 0 5 
Sensitivity 1 1 1 
Specificity 0.889 1 0.902 
Ω 0.944 1 0.951 
 
Table 5.23.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 43 6 49 
False Negatives 2 0 2 
True Negatives 32 5 37 
False Positives 13 1 14 
Sensitivity 0.956 1 0.961 
Specificity 0.711 0.833 0.725 
Ω 0.833 0.917 0.843 
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Table 5.24.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 43 6 49 
False Negatives 2 0 2 
True Negatives 40 6 46 
False Positives 5 0 5 
Sensitivity 0.956 1 0.961 
Specificity 0.889 1 0.902 
Ω 0.922 1 0.931 
 
 
Table 5.25.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 27 6 33 
False Negatives 18 0 18 
True Negatives 42 5 47 
False Positives 3 1 4 
Sensitivity 0.600 1 0.647 
Specificity 0.933 0.833 0.922 
Ω 0.767 0.917 0.784 
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Table 5.26.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 45 6 51 
False Negatives 0 0 0 
True Negatives 39 6 45 
False Positives 6 0 6 
Sensitivity 1 1 1 
Specificity 0.867 1 0.882 
Ω 0.933 1 0.941 
 
Table 5.27.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 26 6 32 
False Negatives 19 0 19 
True Negatives 38 5 43 
False Positives 7 1 8 
Sensitivity 0.578 1 0.627 
Specificity 0.844 0.833 0.843 
Ω 0.711 0.917 0.735 
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Table 5.28.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 20 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 38 6 44 
False Negatives 7 0 7 
True Negatives 40 5 45 
False Positives 5 1 6 
Sensitivity 0.844 1 0.863 
Specificity 0.889 0.833 0.882 
Ω 0.867 0.917 0.873 
 
 
Table 5.29.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 20 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 23 6 29 
False Negatives 22 0 22 
True Negatives 40 5 45 
False Positives 5 1 6 
Sensitivity 0.511 1 0.569 
Specificity 0.889 0.833 0.882 
Ω 0.700 0.917 0.725 
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Table 5.30.  Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples from the Default 
Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 217 28 245 
False Negatives 8 2 10 
True Negatives 200 30 230 
False Positives 25 0 25 
Sensitivity 0.964 0.933 0.961 
Specificity 0.889 1 0.902 
Ω 0.927 0.967 0.931 
  
 
Table 5.31.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the Default 
Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 176 30 206 
False Negatives 49 0 49 
True Negatives 174 25 199 
False Positives 51 5 56 
Sensitivity 0.782 1 0.808 
Specificity 0.773 0.833 0.780 
Ω 0.778 0.917 0.794 
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5.8 Results for All Samples Combined 
In this section, the library of templates is applied to all the target samples, regardless of their 
geometric configuration.  A total of 1,020 samples are used in this last section to test the 
performance of the tiered-filter approach.  The results for the non-tiered approach are also 
presented for comparison. 
The number of True Positives, False Negatives, True Negatives, False Positives, the 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and the objective function Omega calculated using the tiered-filter 
approach and the non-tiered approach to this set of targets are shown in Tables 5.32 and Table 
5.33.  Each table consists of the results for the lower density tier, the higher density tier, as well 
as the final results.  The cut-off values for each tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off 
value for the non-tiered approach, and the samples labeled False Negatives and False Positives 
for both methods are given in Appendix D5. 
 
Table 5.32.  Results Using the Tiered Approach On 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 442 49 491 
False Negatives 8 11 19 
True Negatives 399 60 459 
False Positives 51 0 51 
Sensitivity 0.982 0.817 0.963 
Specificity 0.887 1 0.900 
Ω 0.934 0.908 0.931 
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Table 5.33.  Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach On 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier Final Results 
True Positives 388 55 443 
False Negatives 62 5 67 
True Negatives 324 58 382 
False Positives 126 2 128 
Sensitivity 0.862 0.917 0.869 
Specificity 0.720 0.967 0.749 
Ω 0.791 0.942 0.809 
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CHAPTER 6 – SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Summary 
This study addresses the problem of distinguishing unknown targets that contain nitrogen-rich 
explosive samples from ones that contain non-explosive materials only.  The method proposed to 
solve this problem is called the tiered-filter approach, and is based on the signature-based 
radiation scanning technique [2].   The approach consists on calculating a normalized figure-of-
merit between signatures from an unknown target and signatures from an explosive template 
through tiers (nitrogen first, then oxygen, then carbon, and finally hydrogen).  If the normalized 
figure-of-merit is greater than a specified cut-off value for any given tier, then that specific 
template would not match the target and the process would be repeated for the next explosive 
template until all of the applicable templates have been evaluated. If the signatures of the 
unknown target match all the tiers of a particular template, then the target is assumed to contain 
an explosive. 
An important component of the method is to develop a systematic methodology for 
constructing a library of templates that identifies explosives under different target configurations.  
This was achieved by developing artificial explosive templates.  Artificial explosive templates 
are constructed from signatures for a target that contains a real explosive with an artificial inert 
material used as clutter.  These artificial materials have the function of representing all the 
different real inert materials that can occur in the field.  Additionally, artificial explosive 
templates are constructed or different values of other variables, such as explosive size. 
 A function called Omega was developed in section 3.5.2 to evaluate the performance of 
the technique.  This function takes into account the sensitivity and specificity of the method.  It 
also serves to optimize parameters in the tiered-filter approach.  The simulated annealing 
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algorithm based on the downhill simplex method was used together with the Omega function to 
optimize the results for the different cases evaluated. 
 Computer simulations using MCNP were performed instead of real experiments.  The 
simulation geometry, the explosive and inert samples, as well as a detailed description of how 
the artificial explosive templates were constructed were described in Chapter 4.  The optimized 
results from the simulated data for all the different cases studied are presented in Chapter 5.  
6.2 Conclusions 
This section discusses in detail the results shown in Chapter 5, and draws conclusions from them.  
The study concentrated on the following four main variables that affect the performance of the 
artificial explosive templates: 
 Chemical composition and density of artificial clutter materials 
 Distance of the target from the neutron source 
 Explosive volume 
 Clutter thickness. 
Results in Chapter 5 were obtained by using the tiered-filter approach and the non-tiered 
approach.  Even though the original non-tiered approach makes use of no tier at all, in this study 
the density tier was applied to both methods.  This makes a proper evaluation of the HCNO tiers 
possible by making every other parameter equal.  The sensitivities and specificities shown in the 
tables of Chapter 5 describe how well the methods perform.  The Omega function gives equal 
weight to both the sensitivity and the specificity to give a single value that enables the 
comparison between both methods.  The reasons why some samples resulted in False Positives 
or False Negatives are also discussed and analyzed. 
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6.2.1 Samples with Same Geometric Configuration as Library of Templates 
The results in section 5.4 and Appendix D1 focus on the chemical composition and density of the 
clutter material.  The goal was to test if artificially specified materials and use of discrete values 
of density can be used effectively to represent clutter in the explosive templates.  All the other 
variables were fixed. 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 show that the artificial templates give results for Sensitivity, 
Specificity, and Omega, above 90%.  The sensitivity of the non-tiered approach was slightly 
better than that for the tiered approach.  This was because the tiered approach had 1 False 
Negative (Titanium) from the Higher Density tier samples, while the non-tiered approach had 
none.  On the other hand, the specificity was slightly better for the tiered approach.  In particular, 
this is one situation to be expected because the tiered-filter approach makes it significantly more 
difficult for non-explosive samples lacking enough nitrogen to be confused with nitrogen-rich 
explosives.  This is illustrated by the fact that the targets containing tissue and water led to two 
False Positives (which contained no or very little Nitrogen).  The Omega objective function, 
which gives in this study equal weight to the sensitivity and the specificity, indicates that the 
tiered approach is slightly better than the non-tiered one. 
6.2.2 Samples at Different Distances from the Source 
The objective of the results shown in section 5.5 and Appendix D2 was to isolate the effect of 
changing the position of the samples and to evaluate how well the artificial templates designed 
for a particular distance would perform at evaluating samples at different distances.  In this 
study, the samples were moved closer to the source compared to the sample locations for the 
library of templates. 
Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 indicate that the tiered-filter approach gave results for the 
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sensitivity, specificity, and Omega that were all above 94%, while the non-tiered approach gave 
results that were between 80% and 90%.  The False Positives, False Negatives, and cut off 
values for N and O, are very similar for all tiered-filter approach cases, including the default 
shown in Table 5.6.  The False Positives and False Negatives from the non-tiered approach, 
shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.11, increased significantly compared to the default configuration 
presented in Table 5.7.  In particular, the specificity decreased appreciably.  The results seem to 
indicate that the non-tiered approach is considerably more sensitive to changes in distance of the 
target than are the tiered results. Several materials that don’t contain N were confused as 
explosives in the non-tiered approach.  From these observations, it can be concluded that the 
tiered-filter approach is less sensitive to the specific location of the sample in the target than is 
the non-tiered approach. 
The results from Table 5.12 seem to show further proof that slightly different changes in 
distance don’t affect the sensitivity and specificity of a library of templates when the tiered-filter 
method is used.  On the other hand, Table 5.13 indicates that significantly more False Negatives 
arise when samples at different distances from the source are evaluated.  In this particular study, 
the difference in optimal cut-off values for different configurations is responsible for explaining 
the drastic increase in False Negatives.  The default and 10 cm closer to the target configuration 
had a cut-off value of 4, while the 20 cm closer configuration had a cut-off value of 6.  The 
optimal cut-off value calculated from combining these three configurations turned out to be 4, 
which severely increased the number of False Negatives from the 20 cm closer configuration. 
In the simulations performed in this study, the beam was perfectly collimated. Under 
those circumstances, the tiered-filter approach gave very excellent results.  This study practically 
indicates that reasonable changes in position of the target (closer or further from the neutron 
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source) should not represent a major obstacle for a particular artificial explosive template to 
perform well.  This is important because if beams are well collimated in actual tests then this 
study indicates that the tiered filter approach requires significantly fewer templates for different 
distances from the source.  
6.2.3. Samples with Different Explosive Volumes 
The purpose of the results shown in section 5.6 and Appendix D3 was to study how flexible the 
artificial templates are in terms of evaluating targets with different explosive volumes.  It should 
be noted that the volume of the corresponding inert samples increased as well. 
Tables 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.19 give sensitivity, specificity, and Omega 
results above 94% for the tiered-filter approach, and results above 72% for the non-tiered 
approach.  For the Lower Density Tier, the sensitivity of the tiered-filter approach was 100% for 
all these cases, while the specificity was lower, but still above 91%.  For the Higher density tier, 
the results were reversed, given that the specificity was 100% while the sensitivity decreased 
significantly.  The results for the lower tier occurred because larger explosive volumes contain 
significantly more N, which non-explosive samples don’t have.  Therefore, fewer False 
Negatives result at the end of the nitrogen tier.  However, non-explosive nitrogen rich samples 
would also have their volume increased, making the nitrogen tier less effective against them, thus 
increasing the number of False Positives.  Fertilizer, Herbicide 1, and Nylon appear as False 
Positives on all cases because they contain significant amount of nitrogen, and a relatively 
similar chemical composition to explosives. 
In the case of the Higher Density Tier for the tiered approach, the inert materials (pure 
metals with very high density) do not contain any nitrogen.  Hence, very few False Positives 
result.  On the other hand, because several nitrogen net peaks are significantly smaller for higher 
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tiers, then recognizing a sample as an explosive relies more on the other signatures (hydrogen, 
carbon, and oxygen).  This makes explosives harder to identify, thus yielding a higher number of 
False Negatives.  In spite of these shortcomings, the Omega functions for the tables showing the 
results for the tiered approach are all above 94%. 
The results for the non-tiered approach were not as promising as the tiered filter ones.  
The Omega functions ranged from 75% to 88%.  The sensitivity and the specificity for the 
Higher Density Tier were relatively high, but the specificity for the Lower Density Tier brought 
the overall performance down.  The sensitivities for the 5 cm and 10 cm thicker cases were 
97.8% for both, but for the 15 cm case it was only 71.1%.  The fact that the specificity is 
considerably affected points to the advantage that the tiered approach has over the non-tiered 
one, where the nitrogen tier significantly reduces False Positives. 
Table 5.20 shows that the two main sources that reduce the Omega function are the 
Lower Density Tier Specificity and the Higher Density Tier Sensitivity.  The 12 False Positives 
that reduced the Lower Density Sensitivity Tier were the Fertilizer, Herbicide 1, and Nylon 
cluttered samples from the four different geometric configurations.  All of them contain 
significant amounts of N and, as stated before, concentrations of Hydrogen, Carbon, and Oxygen 
that makes it difficult to distinguish them from explosive samples.  The main contributors to 
decreasing the Higher Density Tier Sensitivity was the Titanium inert sample and, at a smaller 
scale, the Zirconium inert sample.  Table 5.21 shows that the main weakness of the non-tiered 
approach for dealing with samples with larger explosive (and inert) volume are the large amount 
of False Positives, which turned out to be four times as much as the tiered approach. 
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6.2.4 Samples with Different Clutter Thickness 
The objective of the results shown in section 5.7 and Appendix D4 was to isolate the effect of the 
clutter thickness, and study how well the artificial templates designed for a specific clutter 
thickness perform at evaluating a sample with a clutter having a different thickness.  The 
thickness of the clutter was increased from the front for the samples generated in this study. 
 Tables 5.22, 5.24, 5.26, and 5.28, show the results for the tiered-filter approach.  The 
sensitivity, specificity, and the Omega functions for these configurations yielded results above 
88%.  In general, the number of False Negatives for all these cases was very low, which resulted 
in very high sensitivities, above 95%.  The only exception was the case with the thickest clutter, 
which gave a Lower Density Tier sensitivity of 84%, and an overall sensitivity of 86%.  Clearly 
the weakest performance of the tiered-filter approach for samples with different clutter was the 
Lower Density Tier specificity.  The results were between 86 and 89%.  However, the Omega 
function values which reflect the overall performance of the method 87% and 95%.  From 
Appendix D4 that most of the False Positives from the different configurations are the Fertilizer 
A, Herbicide 1, Nylon, Polyurethane, and Tissue inert samples.  All of these inert samples 
contain some amount of nitrogen, which added to the large volumes of clutter increases the 
difficulty for the nitrogen tier to filter samples more effectively. 
  The results for the non-tiered approach are shown in Tables 5.23, 5.25, 5.27, and 5.29.  
The values for the sensitivity, specificity, and the Omega functions for these configurations 
range between 56% and 96%. In general, the Lower Density Tier sensitivity yields the weaker 
performance, except for the results from the 15 cm thick clutter (in this configuration the 
specificity is significantly smaller).  The Omega function values range between 72% and 84%.  
Comparing these performance values with the tiered-filter approach values, indicates a clear 
78 
 
advantage in the use of tiers to better handle the clutter thickness problem. 
 Table 5.30 indicates that samples with thicker clutter will increase the number of False 
Positives particularly for the Lower Density Tier.  The clutter thickness problem is clearly the 
most difficult for the tiered-filter approach to overcome, which means more templates of 
different thicknesses would be required to improve the results.  In spite of this, the Omega values 
for clutter up to 15 cm thicker than the artificial templates were above 93%, which can be 
considered promising.  The results of Table 5.31 indicate that most False Positives and False 
Negatives came from the Lower Density Tier.  This again illustrates the significant advantage 
that filtering targets through a nitrogen tier, in particular, offers.  
6.2.5 All Samples Combined 
Finally, all the explosive and inert samples generated in this study were evaluated and the results 
are shown in Table 5.32, Table 5.33, and Appendix D5.  A total of 1020 samples were used to 
test the performance of the tiered filter approach.  As can be seen in Table 5.3.2 the Higher 
Density Tier sensitivity and the Lower Density Tier specificity, were the areas that decreased the 
overall performance of the tiered-filter method.  The Lower Density Tier specificity was reduced 
by the inert samples such as Fertilizer A, Herbicide 1, and Nylon, that because of their N content 
and chemical composition similar enough to explosives, proved to be the main weakness of the 
method.  Nevertheless, by identifying this “problem” samples, additional tiers can be employed 
that can identify characteristic signatures of these inert materials and be able to filter them.  The 
Higher Density Tier sensitivity was affected mainly by the titanium and, to a lesser degree, by 
the zirconium cluttered explosive samples.  The problem might be arising from the lower 
nitrogen net peaks from these metals.  In here the problem might be solved by developing 
artificial clutter materials that are closer to that of the formerly mentioned metals.  It should also 
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be noticed that the non-tiered approach shown in Table 5.33 gave better results for the Higher 
Density Tier samples.  Therefore, it could be better to use the non-tiered approach to evaluate 
samples when the Higher Density Tier is used. 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
Two possible avenues exist to develop the library of templates necessary for the tiered-filter 
approach to be successfully applied in the field.  One way is to develop this library 
experimentally using real materials that can take the role of the artificial materials described in 
this study.  If materials that have the flexibility required to represent all other real materials exist 
or can be generated needs to be figured out.  The other avenue is to make the MCNP simulations 
as accurate and realistic as possible.  This can be done by comparing and constantly improving 
the net peaks of the different signatures from the simulations with the ones obtained from real 
experimental samples.  Simulations should take into account all the inefficiencies the detectors 
and other components can have.  Elements other than Li, F, P, and Cr can be tried to see if the 
results improve.  The discrete values of the relevant parameters in the artificial templates (such 
as density, clutter thickness, target position, explosive thickness, etc.) can be made finer or more 
coarse, depending on how well they react to changes and how well they compare to real 
experimental samples. 
One aspect that was not developed in the present study, but that could prove to be very 
useful in the field when applying the tiered-filter approach, is to offer a third option of 
identifying the target as a suspect.  This means that if the system cannot be certain enough about 
a target being an explosive or not, it can indicate it to the user, so that other methods of bomb 
detection can be used. 
Whenever the tiered filter approach cannot identify with enough certainty (predetermined by the 
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user) that a target is an explosive, the option of labeling the target as a suspect can be offered.  
The traditional definitions of sensitivity and specificity do not include samples labeled as 
suspects.  Therefore, the sensitivity and specificity of the system can be redefined.  The aim of 
the new definition of these terms is to do it in such a way that the inclusion of suspect samples is 
a natural extension of the traditional definition of the terms.   Table 6.1 shows the possible 
combinations that can occur if the detection system is allowed to label some targets as suspects.  
In Table 6.1 SE stands for explosives labeled as suspects and SI stands for non-explosive (inert) 
samples labeled as suspects. 
 
Table 6.1 Detector Output vs True Status of Test for IED Detection Systems 
Including Targets Labeled as Suspects 
 
Explosive 
Was Present 
No Explosive 
Was Present 
Detector Indicated 
Explosive was Present 
True Positive 
(LE) 
False Positive 
(MI) 
Detector Labeled 
Target as Suspect 
True Suspect 
(SE) 
False Suspect 
(SI) 
Detector Indicated No 
Explosive was Present 
False Negative 
(ME) 
True Negative 
(LI) 
 
 
Total Number of 
Explosive Targets 
(NE) 
Total Number of 
Non-Explosive Targets 
(NI) 
 
The original definition of sensitivity is based on the number of explosives that were 
correctly identified, divided by the total number of explosives.  Therefore, the natural extension 
of the definition to include suspect samples would be to add the number of explosives and 
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explosive suspects that were correctly identified (True Positives and True Suspects), and divide 
them by the total number of explosives.  However, a weight factor (smaller than unity) that 
penalizes the performance of the detection system should be given to the number of samples 
labeled as suspects, because the system was not able to label them as explosives with enough 
certainty.  The definition of sensitivity developed in this study is given by 
1, 

 S
E
ESE
n
N
SL


  ,
       (6.1) 
where εn is the newly defined sensitivity factor, and ωS is the suspect weight factor. 
A similar analysis can be given to the definition of specificity.  The original definition is 
based on the number of inert samples that were correctly identified, divided by the total number 
of inert samples.  Now, inert samples labeled as suspects should be grouped with inert samples 
labeled as explosives, because the former has to undergo secondary tests to verify if it is an 
explosive or not.  So, in this case the natural extension of the definition to include suspect 
samples requires that the original definition of specificity is written in terms of False Positives 
(inerts labeled as explosives) and False Suspects (inerts labeled as suspects).  The suspect weight 
factor is also included and, contrary to the sensitivity, this factor improves the performance 
because False Suspects reduce the specificity by a lesser amount of than False Positives do.  The 
definition of specificity developed in this study is given by 
I
ISII
I
I
p
N
SMN
N
L )( 
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 .       (6.2) 
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APPENDIX A 
In this Appendix a proof that the covariance terms between the variables Uj, Ktj, σ2(Uj), and 
σ2(Ktj), equal identically zero (see section 3.3.2) is presented.  First, it will be shown that the 
covariance between two variables that are independent equals identically zero.  Then, it will be 
shown that the covariance between a variable and its variance also equals identically zero. 
The covariance between any two real-valued random variables x and y with finite second 
moment is defined as 
])][])([[(),cov( yEyxExEyx            (A.1)  
where E[x] and E[y] are the expected values of x and y respectively.  If x and y are independent 
variables, then their covariance is given by 
 ]][][][][[),cov( yExExyEyxExyEyx   
Using the linear property of the expected value operator 
  ]][][[]][[]][[][ yExEExyEEyxEExyE   
Factoring out the expected values inside the expected value operator, and using the fact that 
under independence E[xy]=E[x]E[y] gives 
  ]1[][][][][][][][][ EyExEyExExEyEyExE 
 
  
0
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Therefore, the covariance terms between Uj and Ktj, Uj and σ2(Ktj), Ktj and σ2(Uj), and σ2(Uj) and 
σ2(Ktj), equal zero. 
Now it will be shown that the covariance between a variable and its variance equals 
identically zero.  Starting with the definition of covariance 
)])]([)(])([[())(,cov( 222 xExxExExx           (A.2)  
Distributing the inside terms 
)]]([][)(][)]([)([ 2222 xExExxExxExxE  
 
Applying the expected value operator 
 
)]]([][[)](][[)]]([[)]([ 2222 xExEExxEExxEExxE  
 
Because the expected values are constant, the expected values within others can be factored out.  
Doing so results in 
 
]1[)]([][)]([][][)]([)]([ 2222 ExExExExExExExxE  
 
Using the fact that the expected value of one is one, the last two terms cancel each other.  The 
result is then 
 
][)]([)]([ 22 xExExxE  
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The definition of the variance a variable x is σ2(x)=E[x2]-(E[x])2.  Substituting this definition in 
the previous equation gives 
 ][}]])[(][[{}]])[(][{[ 2222 xExExEExExExE   
Distributing the inside terms 
 ][}]])[(][[{]])[(][[ 2222 xExExEExExxxEE   
Factoring out the expected values within the expected value operators and simplifying 
 ][])[(][][][])[(][][ 2222 xExExExExExExExE   
 0  
Therefore, it has been shown that the covariance between Uj and σ2(Uj), and Ktj and σ2(Ktj) equal 
identically zero.  Result which was used in section 3.3.2 
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APPENDIX B 
In this Appendix the two approximations for the standard deviation of the figure-of-merit 
described in section 3.3.2 are derived.  The figure-of-merit for the template-matching procedure 
developed by Dunn [3] is of the following chi-square-like form 
 
    
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  ,      (B.1) 
where Uj is the jth measured signature of an unknown sample, Ktj is the jth signature for the tth 
template, J is the number of signatures, β is a factor that scales the measured values to the 
template values, σ2 is the variance, and αj is a normalized weight factor defined as 
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 ,          (B.2) 
with ωj being a positive weight for the jth signature.  From Equation (B.2) it can be concluded 
that 
1
1


J
j
j ,          (B.3) 
An estimate of the standard deviation of this figure-of-merit has been derived from the 
propagation of errors formula [3].  The propagation of errors formula is given by  
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where f is any given function of the variables a and b, σ2(a) and σ2(b) are the variances of the 
variables a and b, respectively, and cov(ab) is the covariance between these variables. 
It was shown in Appendix A, that the covariance between two independent variables or 
the covariance between a variable and its variance equals identically zero.  Therefore, the 
covariance terms between the variables Uj, Ktj, σ2(Uj), and σ2(Ktj) equal zero.  Subsequently, the 
standard deviation of the figure-of-merit of Eq. (B.1) simplifies to 
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The terms σ2(σ2(Uj)) and σ2(σ2(Ktj)) are known as the variance of the variance (VOV).  The 
partial derivatives of each of the terms in Eq. (B.5) are 
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and 
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First Approximation 
If the VOV terms are neglected, a first approximation to the standard deviation can be obtained.  
Neglecting the VOV terms and substituting Eq. (B.6) and Eq. (B.7) into Eq. (B.5) gives 
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Simplifying Eq. (B.10) gives 
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This first approximation is the one used in the original formulation of the SBRS technique [3, 4]. 
Second Approximation 
If the VOV terms are not neglected, a second, more accurate approximation to the standard 
deviation of the figure-of-merit can be made.  Using the result derived in Appendix C, the VOV 
is given by 
 )())(( 222 xx   .         (B.11) 
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Therefore the VOV of the variance terms can be written as 
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        (B.12) 
and 
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        (B.13) 
Substituting Eqs. (B.6), (B.7), (B.8), and (B.9) into Eq. (B.5) gives 
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Simplifying the first term, and rewriting the second term so that they have a common factor 
gives 
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Factoring out the common term results in 
     
 
2/1
1
3222
222242
222
22
)()(4
))(())((
1
)()(
)4(
)(





























 

J
j tjj
tjjtjj
tjj
tjjj
t
KU
KUKU
KU
KU





. 
94 
 
Substituting the VOV terms by Eqs. (B.12) and (B.13) gives 
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The results calculated for each bin of the MCNP5 simulations are given in gammas emitted from 
the target per incident neutron.  Therefore, in order to illustrate the use of the standard deviation 
of the FOM for a realistic situation, it can be assumed that the the total number of neutrons 
emitted to the target, times the efficiency of the gamma detector, results in 109 counts.  The 
results in Table B.1 are obtained by multiplying the results from each bin used for calculations 
by 109, and by assuming that the counts are poisoned distributed.  The figure-of-merit and their 
corresponding standard deviations (with and without the VOV terms) for two explosive and two 
inert samples, are compare in Table B.1. 
 
Table B.1 Comparison of FOM Standard Deviation With and Without the VOV Terms 
 
Ζ 
σ(ζ) without 
VOV Term 
σ(ζ) with 
VOV Term 
Percentage 
Difference(%) 
Aluminum Explosive 8.58 1.95 1.98 1.31 
Aluminum Inert 49.99 4.71 5.23 10.36 
Salt Explosive 3.73 1.29 1.29 0.53 
Salt Inert 50.02 4.71 5.23 10.35 
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APPENDIX C 
This Appendix shows two derivations.  First, the derivation of the variance of the sample 
variance for a Poisson distribution is presented.  Then, the VOV for the net peaks of the 
signatures used in the figure-of-merit is derived. 
Starting with the definition of variance, the variance of the sample variance is given by 
)))(ˆ[())(ˆ( 22222   kEk ,       (C.1) 
where σ2(k) is the sample variance based on k observations and σ2 is the population variance. 
For a poisson distribution, the mean and the variance have the same value.  This fact can be used 
to express the VOV for a poisson distribution in terms of the sample mean, such that 
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where x(k) is the sample mean based on k observations, μ is the population mean, and x(i) is the 
measurement value for the ith observation.  Substituting Eqs. (C.2) and (C.3) into Eq. (C.1) gives 
96 
 
 
         
       2
2
2
2
2
11 1
2
1
2
2
2
11 1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
22
2
1
11
)(
2
)()(
1
)(
1
)(
2
)()(
1
)(
1
)(
2
)(
1
)(
1
))(ˆ(
























































































 
 


xk
k
xxkk
k
xk
k
EixE
k
jxEixE
k
ixE
k
ix
k
jxix
k
ix
k
E
ix
k
ix
k
E
ix
k
Ek
k
i
k
i
k
j
k
i
k
i
k
i
k
j
k
i
k
i
k
i
k
i
.
 
By realizing that 
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and 
 x
,          (C.5) 
then 
 
 
k
kkk
kk
xx
k
k
x
k
k



















22
2
2
2
2222
222222
2
2
1
1
1
2
)1(1
))(ˆ(
.
    (C.6) 
97 
 
Because μ is not known it should be approximated by the sample mean or the sample variance, 
such that 
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or in terms of the sample variance is 
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Now, the variance of the sample variance for the signatures used in the figure-of-merit is 
derived.  The net peak of a signature obtained from an unknown target is given by 
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where Rn, is the number of counts for the n
th bin, and Rn+1, and Rn-1 are the number of counts for 
the two adjacent bins.  Applying the standard propagation of errors formula to Eq. (C.9) gives 
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Therefore 
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By applying the standard propagation of errors formula again to Eq. (C.12) it follows that 
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Assuming a poisson distribution for the counts under each bin and using Eq. (C.8) with k=1 
yields 
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Therefore, the variance of the sample variance for the net peak of a signature is given by 
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APPENDIX D1 
This Appendix shows the cut-off values for each tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off 
value for the non-tiered approach, as well as the False Negatives and False Positives of the 
results for both methods shown in section 5.4.  In the Table, the values under the title range 
indicate the range of values that the cutoff could have taken and still obtain the same result.  
 
Table D1.1.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with the 
Same Geometrical Configuration as the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 16 16 40 5 0 5 
C 62 62 125 44 44 90 
N 58 58 78 144 144 178 
O 24 24 29 84 50 84 
 
 
Table D1.2.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with the 
Same Geometrical Configuration as the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 4 49 
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Table D1.3.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with the Same Geometrical Configuration as the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A Aluminum   Titanium 
2 Fertilizer B       
3 Nylon       
 
Table D1.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
Samples with the Same Geometrical Configuration as the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Fertilizer A Herbicide 2     
2 Herbicide 1       
3 Nylon       
4 Tissue       
5 Water       
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APPENDIX D2 
 
This Appendix shows the cut-off values for each tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off 
value for the non-tiered approach, as well as the False Negatives and False Positives of the 
results for both methods shown in section 5.5.  In the Table, the values under the title range 
indicate the range of values that the cutoff could have taken and still obtain the same result.  
 
Table D2.1.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach 
On Samples 10 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 85 80 85 0 0 1 
C 50 11 50 200 200 200 
N 71 71 89 200 200 200 
O 29 13 29 71 56 96 
 
 
Table D2.2.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
On Samples 10 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 4 49 
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Table D2.3.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach 
On Samples 10 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A Aluminum   Titanium 
2 Herbicide 1       
3 Nylon       
 
Table D2.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
On Samples 10 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Fertilizer A     
2 Cotton       
3 Fertilizer A       
4 Herbicide 1       
5 Limestone       
6 Lucite       
7 Nylon       
8 Plexiglass       
9 Tissue       
10 Water       
 
Table D2.5.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach 
On Samples 20 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 25 25 34 172 161 178 
C 117 117 147 199 200 200 
N 69 69 74 111 55 111 
O 21 21 23 39 37 39 
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Table D2.6.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
On Samples 20 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 6 41 
 
 
Table D2.7.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach 
On Samples 20 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A Aluminum     
2 Herbicide 1 Concrete     
3 Nylon       
 
Table D2.8.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
On Samples 20 cm Closer to the Source than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Carbon     
2 Ethanol Cardboard     
3 Herbicide 1 Cherrywood     
4 Limestone Fertilizer A     
5 Lucite Polyurethane     
6 Nylon Tissue     
7 Petroleum Water     
8 Plexiglass Woodoak     
9 Polyethylene       
10 Sugar       
11 Tissue       
12 Wax       
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Table D2.9.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as Samples 10 cm and 20 cm Closer to the Source 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 24 24 33 138 137 200 
C 181 181 191 200 199 200 
N 65 65 75 200 195 200 
O 27 27 29 67 41 79 
 
Table D2.10.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as Samples 10 cm and 20 cm Closer to the Source 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 4 50 
 
Table D2.11.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples from the Default Configuration as well as Samples 10 cm and 20 cm 
Closer to the Source 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positive   False Negative   
1 Fertilizer A   Aluminum           
2 Herbicide 1   Concrete           
3 Nylon   Aluminum           
4 Fertilizer A   Aluminum           
5 Herbicide 1               
6 Nylon               
7 Fertilizer A               
8 Herbicide 1               
9 Nylon               
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Table D2.12.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
on Samples from the Default Configuration as well as Samples 10 cm and 20 cm 
Closer to the Source 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives  False Negatives  
1 Fertilizer A 
 
Herbicide 2 
 
        
2 Herbicide 1 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
3 Nylon 
 
Air 
 
        
4 Tissue 
 
Antifreeze 
 
        
5 Water 
 
Carbon 
 
        
6 Antifreeze 
 
Cardboard 
 
        
7 Cotton 
 
Cherrywood 
 
        
8 Fertilizer A 
 
Cotton 
 
        
9 Herbicide 1 
 
Cyanurate 
 
        
10 Limestone 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
11 Lucite 
 
Petroleum 
 
        
12 Nylon 
 
Polyethylene 
 
        
13 Plexiglass 
 
Polypropylene 
 
        
14 Tissue 
 
Polystyrene 
 
        
15 Water 
 
Polyurethane 
 
        
16 Antifreeze 
 
Propane 
 
        
17 Ethanol 
 
Rubber 
 
        
18 Herbicide 1 
 
Styrafoam 
 
        
19 Petroleum 
 
Sugar 
 
        
20 Tissue 
 
Tissue 
 
        
21 Wax 
 
Void 
 
        
22     Water 
 
        
23     Wax 
 
        
24     Woodoak 
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APPENDIX D3 
This Appendix shows the cut-off values for each tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off 
value for the non-tiered approach, as well as the False Negatives and False Positives of the 
results for both methods shown in section 5.6.  In the Table, the values under the title range 
indicate the range of values that the cutoff could have taken and still obtain the same result.  
 
Table D3.1.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 72 72 97 64 60 72 
C 25 25 47 195 196 197 
N 34 34 55 53 53 79 
O 7 7 21 155 123 155 
 
 
Table D3.2.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 5 90 
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Table D3.3.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Explosive 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A       
2 Herbicide 1       
3 Nylon       
 
Table D3.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Explosive 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Fertilizer A Steel   
2 Cotton       
3 Fertilizer A       
4 Herbicide 1       
5 Limestone       
6 Lucite       
7 Nylon       
8 Plexiglass       
9 Tissue       
10 Water       
 
Table D3.5.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 81 81 87 14 2 14 
C 51 51 53 200 200 200 
N 18 18 18 130 129 175 
O 46 46 49 21 11 36 
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Table D3.6.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 6 86 
 
Table D3.7.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Explosive 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A     Titanium 
2 Herbicide 1     Zirconium 
3 Nylon       
4 Petroleum       
 
Table D3.8.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Explosive 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Fertilizer A Steel   
2 Cotton       
3 Ethanol       
4 Fertilizer A       
5 Herbicide 1       
6 Limestone       
7 Lucite       
8 Nylon       
9 Petroleum       
10 Plexiglass       
11 Sugar       
12 Tissue       
13 Water       
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Table D3.9.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 92 92 95 199 198 200 
C 84 84 94 160 139 184 
N 46 46 63 45 45 86 
O 24 24 24 120 47 200 
 
 
Table D3.10.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Explosive 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 6 60 
 
Table D3.11.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Explosive 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A     Zirconium 
2 Herbicide 1       
3 Nylon       
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Table D3.12.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
on Samples with Explosive 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Air     
2 Cotton Antifreeze     
3 Ethanol Cardboard     
4 Herbicide 1 Cherrywood     
5 Limestone Cyanurate     
6 Lucite Fertilizer A     
7 Nylon Polystyrene     
8 Petroleum Polyurethane     
9 Plexiglass Propane     
10 Sugar Tissue     
11 Tissue Void     
12  Wax Water     
13   Woodoak     
 
Table D3.13.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 95 90 97 0 0 1 
C 180 168 193 200 159 200 
N 50 50 62 192 193 196 
O 17 17 24 75 75 86 
 
Table D3.14.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 6 49 
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Table D3.15.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples from the Default Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positive   False Negative   
1 Fertilizer A   Aluminum       Titanium   
2 Herbicide 1           Titanium   
3 Nylon           Titanium   
4 Fertilizer A           Zirconium   
5 Herbicide 1           Titanium   
6 Nylon           Zirconium   
7 Fertilizer A               
8 Herbicide 1               
9 Nylon               
10 Fertilizer A               
11 Herbicide 1               
12 Nylon               
 
Table D3.16.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
2 Cotton 
 
Air 
 
        
3 Fertilizer A 
 
Antifreeze 
 
        
4 Herbicide 1 
 
Cardboard 
 
        
5 Limestone 
 
Cherrywood 
 
        
6 Lucite 
 
Cyanurate 
 
        
7 Nylon 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
8 Plexiglass 
 
Polystyrene 
 
        
9 Sugar 
 
Polyurethane 
 
        
10 Tissue 
 
Propane 
 
        
11 Water 
 
Tissue 
 
        
12 Antifreeze 
 
Void 
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Table D3.16.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
13 Cotton 
 
Water 
 
        
14 Ethanol 
 
Woodoak 
 
        
15 Fertilizer A 
 
            
16 Herbicide 1 
 
            
17 Limestone 
 
            
18 Lucite 
 
            
19 Nylon 
 
            
20 Plexiglass 
 
            
21 Sugar 
 
            
22 Tissue 
 
            
23 Water 
 
            
24 Antifreeze 
 
            
25 Cotton 
 
            
26 Ethanol 
 
            
27 Fertilizer A 
 
            
28 Herbicide 1 
 
            
29 Limestone 
 
            
30 Lucite 
 
            
31 Nylon 
 
            
32 Petroleum 
 
            
33 Plexiglass 
 
            
34 Sugar 
 
            
35 Tissue 
 
            
36 Water 
 
            
37 Antifreeze 
 
            
38 Cotton 
 
            
39 Ethanol 
 
            
40 Herbicide 1 
 
            
41 Limestone 
 
            
42 Lucite 
 
            
43 Nylon 
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Table D3.16.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Explosives 5, 10 and 15 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
44 Petroleum 
 
            
45 Plexiglass 
 
            
46 Sugar 
 
            
47 Tissue 
 
            
48 Wax 
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APPENDIX D4 
This Appendix shows the cut-off values for each tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off 
value for the non-tiered approach, as well as the False Negatives and False Positives of the 
results for both methods shown in section 5.7.  In the Table, the values under the title range 
indicate the range of values that the cutoff could have taken and still obtain the same result.  
 
Table D4.1.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 101 101 104 4 4 17 
C 31 31 48 168 75 168 
N 54 54 62 73 74 97 
O 26 26 27 200 164 200 
 
Table D4.2.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 7 86 
 
 
115 
 
Table D4.3.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Clutter 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A       
2 Herbicide 1       
3 Nylon       
4 Polyurethane       
5 Tissue       
 
 
Table D4.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Clutter 5 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Aluminum Steel   
2 Cotton Salt     
3 Ethanol       
4 Fertilizer A       
5 Herbicide 1       
6 Limestone       
7 Lucite       
8 Nylon       
9 Petroleum       
10 Glass       
11 Sugar       
12 Tissue       
13 Wax       
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Table D4.5.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 125 125 127 0 0 1 
C 30 30 73 176 168 193 
N 24 24 28 170 163 191 
O 26 26 27 60 60 87 
 
 
Table D4.6.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 3 86 
 
Table D4.7.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Clutter 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A Aluminum     
2 Herbicide 1 Glass     
3 Nylon       
4 Polyurethane       
5 Tissue       
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Table D4.8.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Clutter 10 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Ethanol Aluminum Steel   
2 Herbicide 1 Borax     
3 Tissue Carbon     
4   Ceramic     
5   Concrete     
6   Fertilizer A     
7   Glass     
8   Granite     
9   Herbicide 3     
10   Khydroxide     
11   Nylon     
12   Salt     
13   Soap     
14   Soil     
15   Soy     
16   Styrafoam     
17   Water     
18   Woodoak     
 
Table D4.9.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 169 117 169 0 0 1 
C 64 52 64 67 64 67 
N 55 55 58 199 199 200 
O 47 47 48 83 80 87 
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Table D4.10.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 4 85 
 
Table D4.11.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Clutter 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A 
 
    
2 Herbicide 1       
3 Nylon       
4 Petroleum       
5 Polyurethane       
6 Tissue       
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Table D4.12.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
on Samples with Clutter 15 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze Aluminum Steel   
2 Ethanol Borax     
3 Herbicide 1 Carbon     
4 Petroleum Cardboard     
5 Polyethylene Ceramic     
6 Polypropylene Cotton     
7 Tissue Fertilizer A     
8   Glass     
9   Granite     
10   Herbicide 2     
11   Herbicide 3     
12   Khydroxide     
13   Lucite     
14   Nylon     
15   Salt     
16   Soap     
17   Soil     
18   Sugar     
19   Woodoak     
 
Table D4.13.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 20 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 80 80 96 0 0 1 
C 52 52 68 77 75 99 
N 84 84 91 200 197 200 
O 60 60 67 200 195 200 
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Table D4.14.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples with 
Clutter 20 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 5 79 
 
Table D4.15.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples with Clutter 20 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positive False Negative 
1 Fertilizer A Aluminum Steel   
2 Herbicide 1 Bricks     
3 Nylon Cermic     
4 Petroleum Concrete     
5 Tissue Glass     
6   Granite     
7   Salt     
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Table D4.16.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
on Samples with Clutter 20 cm Thicker than the Default Configuration 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Ethanol Aluminum Steel   
2 Gasoline Borax     
3 Petroleum Carbon     
4 Soap Cardboard     
5 Tissue Ceramic     
6   Cotton     
7   Fertilizer A     
8   Glass     
9   Granite     
10   Herbicide 1     
11   Herbicide 2     
12   Herbicide 3     
13   Khydroxide     
14   Limestone     
15   Lucite     
16   Nylon     
17   Plexiglass     
18   Salt     
19   Soil     
20   Soy     
21   Sugar     
22   Woodoak     
 
Table D4.17.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 172 172 172 0 0 1 
C 45 45 46 75 76 89 
N 61 61 61 185 185 195 
O 22 22 22 95 94 99 
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Table D4.18.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on Samples from the 
Default Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 5 78 
 
Table D4.19.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
Samples from the Default Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positive   False Negative   
1 Herbicide 1   Aluminum       Steel   
2 Nylon   Carbon       Titanium   
3 Petroleum   Fertilizer A           
4 Polyurethane   Salt           
5 Tissue   Aluminum           
6 Fertilizer A   Salt           
7 Herbicide 1   Aluminum           
8 Nylon   Salt           
9 Polyurethane               
10 Tissue               
11 Fertilizer A               
12 Herbicide 1               
13 Nylon               
14 Polyurethane               
15 Tissue               
16 Bricks               
17 Herbicide 1               
18 Nylon               
19 Polyurethane               
20 Tissue               
21 Fertilizer A               
22 Herbicide 1               
23 Nylon               
24 Polyurethane               
25 Tissue               
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Table D4.20.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
on Samples from the Default Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
1 Antifreeze 
 
Aluminum 
 
Steel 
 
    
2 Cotton 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
Steel 
 
    
3 Fertilizer A 
 
Khydroxide 
 
Steel 
 
    
4 Herbicide 1 
 
Salt 
 
Steel 
 
    
5 Limestone 
 
Aluminum 
 
Steel 
 
    
6 Lucite 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
7 Nylon 
 
Herbicide 3 
 
        
8 Plexiglass 
 
Salt 
 
        
9 Sugar 
 
Soil 
 
        
10 Tissue 
 
Water 
 
        
11 Water 
 
Khydroxide 
 
        
12 Antifreeze 
 
Woodoak 
 
        
13 Cotton 
 
Aluminum 
 
        
14 Ethanol 
 
Borax 
 
        
15 Fertilizer A 
 
Carbon 
 
        
16 Herbicide 1 
 
Cardboard 
 
        
17 Limestone 
 
Ceramic 
 
        
18 Lucite 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
19 Nylon 
 
Glass 
 
        
20 Petroleum 
 
Granite 
 
        
21 Glass 
 
Herbicide 2 
 
        
22 Sugar 
 
Herbicide 3 
 
        
23 Tissue 
 
Khydroxide 
 
        
24 Antifreeze 
 
Nylon 
 
        
25 Cotton 
 
Salt 
 
        
26 Ethanol 
 
Soil 
 
        
27 Fertilizer A 
 
Woodoak 
 
        
28 Herbicide 1 
 
Aluminum 
 
        
29 Herbicide 2 
 
Borax 
 
        
30 Limestone 
 
Carbon 
 
        
31 Lucite 
 
Cardboard 
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Table D4.20.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach 
on Samples from the Default Configuration as well as with Clutter 5, 10, 15 and 20 cm Thicker 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive False Negative False Positives False Negatives 
32 Nylon 
 
Ceramic 
 
        
33 Petroleum 
 
Cotton 
 
        
34 Plexiglass 
 
Fertilizer A 
 
        
35 Polyethylene 
 
Glass 
 
        
36 Polypropylene 
 
Granite 
 
        
37 Soy 
 
Herbicide 1 
 
        
38 Sugar 
 
Herbicide 2 
 
        
39 Tissue 
 
Herbicide 3 
 
        
40 Antifreeze 
 
Khydroxide 
 
        
41 Ethanol 
 
Limestone 
 
        
42 Herbicide 1 
 
Lucite 
 
        
43 Petroleum 
 
Nylon 
 
        
44 Polyethylene 
 
Plexiglass 
 
        
45 Polypropylene 
 
Salt 
 
        
46 Tissue 
 
Soil 
 
        
47 Ethanol 
 
Soy 
 
        
48 Gasoline 
 
Sugar 
 
        
49 Petroleum 
 
Woodoak 
 
        
50 Soap 
 
            
51 Tissue 
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APPENDIX D5 
This Appendix shows the cut-off values for each tier of the tiered-filter approach and the cut-off 
value for the non-tiered approach, as well as the False Negatives and False Positives of the 
results for both methods shown in section 5.8.  In the Table, the values under the title range 
indicate the range of values that the cutoff could have taken and still obtain the same result.  
 
Table D5.1.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
 
Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off Range Cut-Off Range 
H 106 106 109 0 0 1 
C 50 50 56 199 199 200 
N 61 61 61 198 198 200 
O 22 22 22 80 79 86 
 
 
Table D5.2.  Cut-Off Values for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
 Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
Cut-Off 6 55 
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Table D5.3.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positive   False Negative   
1 Fertilizer A   Aluminum       Copper   
2 Herbicide 1   Carbon       Steel   
3 Nylon   Fertilizer A       Titanium   
4 Polyurethane   Salt       Titanium   
5 Tissue   Aluminum       Titanium   
6 Herbicide 1   Salt       Zirconium   
7 Nylon   Aluminum       Titanium   
8 Petroleum   Salt       Zirconium   
9 Polyurethane           Titanium   
10 Tissue           Zirconium   
11 Fertilizer A           Titanium   
12 Herbicide 1               
13 Nylon               
14 Polyurethane               
15 Tissue               
16 Fertilizer A               
17 Herbicide 1               
18 Nylon               
19 Polyurethane               
20 Tissue               
21 Fertilizer A               
22 Herbicide 1               
23 Nylon               
24 Polyurethane               
25 Tissue               
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Table D5.3.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positive   False Negative   
26 Fertilizer A               
27 Herbicide 1               
28 Nylon               
29 Polyurethane               
30 Tissue               
31 Fertilizer A               
32 Herbicide 1               
33 Nylon               
34 Polyurethane               
35 Tissue               
36 Fertilizer A               
37 Herbicide 1               
38 Nylon               
39 Polyurethane               
40 Tissue               
41 Fertilizer A               
42 Herbicide 1               
43 Nylon               
44 Petroleum               
45 Polyurethane               
46 Tissue               
47 Fertilizer A               
48 Herbicide 1               
49 Nylon               
50 Polyurethane               
51 Tissue               
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Table D5.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positives   False Negatives   
1 Antifreeze   Aluminum   Steel   Copper   
2 Cotton   Borax   Steel   Lead   
3 Fertilizer A   Carbon       Steel   
4 Herbicide 1   Cardboard       Zirconium   
5 Limestone   Ceramic       Lead   
6 Lucite   Cotton           
7 Nylon   Fertilizer A           
8 Plexiglass   Glass           
9 Sugar   Granite           
10 Tissue   Herbicide 1           
11 Water   Herbicide 2           
12 Antifreeze   Herbicide 3           
13 Ethanol   Khydroxide           
14 Gasoline   Lucite           
15 Nylon   Salt           
16 Petroleum   Soil           
17 Polypropylene   Sugar           
18 Rubber   Woodoak           
19 Soap   Aluminum           
20 Tissue   Borax           
21 Water   Carbon           
22 Antifreeze   Cardboard           
23 Ethanol   Fertilizer A           
24 Gasoline   Herbicide 2           
25 Herbicide 1   Herbicide 3           
26 Limestone   Khydroxide           
27 Petroleum   Nylon           
28 Plexiglass   Salt           
29 Polyethylene   Soil           
30 Polypropylene   Woodoak           
31 Rubber   Aluminum           
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Table D5.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positives   False Negatives   
32 Soap   Fertilizer A           
33 Soy   Herbicide 3           
34 Tissue   Salt           
35 Water   Soil           
36 Wax   Water           
37 Antifreeze   Aluminum           
38 Cotton   Khydroxide           
39 Ethanol   Salt           
40 Fertilizer A   Fertilizer A           
41 Herbicide 1   Air           
42 Herbicide 2   Antifreeze           
43 Limestone   Cardboard           
44 Lucite   Cherrywood           
45 Nylon   Cyanurate           
46 Petroleum   Fertilizer A           
47 Plexiglass   Polystyrene           
48 Polyethylene   Polyurethane           
49 Polypropylene   Propane           
50 Soy   Tissue           
51 Sugar   Void           
52 Tissue   Water           
53 Wax   Woodoak           
54 Antifreeze   Carbon           
55 Cotton   Cardboard           
56 Ethanol   Cherrywood           
57 Fertilizer A   Fertilizer A           
58 Herbicide 1   Polyurethane           
59 Limestone   Tissue           
60 Lucite   Water           
61 Nylon   Woodoak           
62 Petroleum   Fertilizer A           
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Table D5.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positives   False Negatives   
63 Plexiglass               
64 Sugar               
65 Tissue               
66 Antifreeze               
67 Cotton               
68 Ethanol               
69 Fertilizer A               
70 Herbicide 1               
71 Limestone               
72 Lucite               
73 Nylon               
74 Plexiglass               
75 Sugar               
76 Tissue               
77 Water               
78 Antifreeze               
79 Cotton               
80 Ethanol               
81 Fertilizer A               
82 Herbicide 1               
83 Lucite               
84 Nylon               
85 Petroleum               
86 Plexiglass               
87 Sugar               
88 Tissue               
89 Water               
90 Antifreeze               
91 Cotton               
92 Ethanol               
93 Herbicide 1               
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Table D5.4.  False Positives and False Negatives for Results Using the Non-Tiered Approach on 
All Samples Generated for this Study 
  Lower Density Tier Higher Density Tier 
  False Positive   False Negative   False Positives   False Negatives   
94 Limestone               
95 Lucite               
96 Nylon               
97 Petroleum               
98 Plexiglass               
99 Sugar               
100 Tissue               
101 Wax               
102 Antifreeze               
103 Ethanol               
104 Herbicide 1               
105 Limestone               
106 Lucite               
107 Nylon               
108 Petroleum               
109 Plexiglass               
110 Polyethylene               
111 Sugar               
112 Tissue               
113 Wax               
114 Antifreeze               
115 Cotton               
116 Ethanol               
117 Fertilizer A               
118 Herbicide 1               
119 Limestone               
120 Lucite               
121 Nylon               
122 Plexiglass               
123 Sugar               
124 Tissue               
125 Water               
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APPENDIX E 
The element involved, the energy (MeV), the type of reaction, and the cross section for each of 
the nine signatures used in this study are presented in Table E.1. 
 
Table E.1.  Properties of Signatures used in the Present Study 
Element 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Type of Reaction 
Thermal σ 
(barns) 
14.1 MeV σ 
(barns) 
Hydrogen 2.2232 Prompt-Capture 0.3326 - 
Carbon 4.4390 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.2106 
Nitrogen 2.3128 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.0557 
Nitrogen 3.3786 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.0109 
Nitrogen 4.9151 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.00687 
Nitrogen 5.1059 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.0437 
Nitrogen 6.4462 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.0122 
Oxygen 6.1299 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.144 
Oxygen 6.9171 Inelastic-Scatter - 0.0317 
 
